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FOREWORD 
1. By General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XX I ) of 5 December 
1966, the Secretary-General was requested to prepare, with the assist-
ance of qualified consultant experts, a report on the effects of the 
possible usc of nuclear weapons and all the security and economic impli-
cations for St:lIes of the acquisition and further development of these 
weapons. 
2. In pursuance of this resolution, I appointed a group of consul-
tant experts whose members were: \Vilhelm Billig. Chairman of the 
State Council for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Poland; Alfonso 
Leon de Garay, Director of the Genetics and Radiobiology Programme, 
National Nuclear Energy Commission, Mexico; Vasily S. EmciY3nov. 
Chairman of the COlllmission on the Scientific Problems of Disarmament 
of the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 
Martin Fehrm, Director General of the Research Institute of Swedish 
National Defence; Bertrand Goldschmidt, Director of External Relation;; 
and Planning, Atomic Energy Commission, France; \V. Bennett Lewis, 
Senior Vice-President, Science, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited: 
Takashi :MukaillO, Professor, Faculty of Engineering, University of 
Tokyo, Japan; H. ~1. A. Onitiri, Director, Nigerian Institute of Social 
and Economic Research, University of Tbadan. N igeria; John G. Palfrey, 
Professor of Law, Columbia University, New York, United States of 
Ame rica; Gunnar Randers, ~lallaging Director, Xorwegian In sti tute for 
Atomic Energy; Vikralll A. Sarabhai, Chairlllan, Atomic Ene rgy Com-
mission of India; Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to lkr 
Majesty's GO\'Crnlilent, United Kingdom. Mr. i\o[ullath A. Vellocli. 
Deputy to the Under-Secretary, Department of Political and Security 
Council Affairs, servc'(\ as Chairman. He was assisted by me11lLers of 
the Secretariat. 
3. The consultant experts, in their personal capacities, have ~ub­
mined to me a report containing their considered and unanimous view~ 
on the variOllS and complex aspects of the subject matter of this report. 
The consultant experts have approachecl their task in the spirit of the 
resolution of the General Assembly and it gives me very great satisfac-
tion that they were able through co·operation and understanding to come 
up with a unanimous report. \Vhat makes the report particularly valu-
able is the fact that, in tryi ng to reach unanimity, the expert consultants 
have not avoided sensitive or even controversial issues. This is extremely 
significant because the value of the report lies in its clear and fair exposi-
tion of the problem. I am very pleased to be able to endorse their find-
ings. I wish also to record my most sincere appreciation for their invalu-
able assistance in carrying out an important and delicate task. 
iii ./ 
4, I ha\'c thcrefore decided to transmit thei r report in fu ll to the 
General Assembly as the report called for by resolution 2162 A (XX I ), 
It is with a sensc of gratification that I submit this report. As I wrote 
last year in the introduction to thc annual report on the work of thc 
Organization, " T believe that the time has come for an appropri ate body 
of the U nited Nations to explore and weigh the impact and implications 
of all aspects of nuclear weapons, , , To know the true nature of Ihe 
danger we face may be a most important first step towards averting ii", 
It is my hope that this report, and the ensuing debate by the General 
Assembly, will not only prov ide a deeper and dearer understanding of 
the effects of the nuclear arms race but also positively contribute to tht' 
"(';Irch for way~ to hring it to an em!. 
i\" 
U TII A="T 
Secretary-C I'II ('r(l1 
C.ONTENTS 
Leiter of transmittal 
J. Effects of the possible lise of nuclear weapons 
J I. Economic implications of the acquisition and furthe r de· 
velopmcnt of nuclear weapons...................... . 21 
I J J. Security implications of the acqllisition and furthe r (Ie-
\'dopl11ent of nuclear weapons ........ . . ...... ...... 31 
ANNEXES 
I. General chamctcrislics of nuclear explosion.-; 39 
IT. Genetic effeets of nuclear radiation............ . ..... 51 
I [ r. References for section I .. ................... .•..... 53 
1\', Basic costs of nuclear warheads ........•....... . ..... 54 
v 
U i'l''I'ER Of' TRANSMITTA L 
6 October 1967 
\Ve have the honour to submit herewith a unanimous report on the 
effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security anu 
e«lllomic implications for States of the acquisition and further develop· 
llIent of these weapons which we wefe invited to prepare in purslIano:e 
of General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI ). 
The report was df;tfted du ring meetings held in Geneva between 
G and 10 ),Jarch and between 26 June and 5 July 1%7, and finalizl'<.l 
at meetings held in :-Jew York between 2 and 6 OClober 1967. Mr. ~1. A. 
Vellod i, Deputy to the Under-Secretary, Dcp.ulmel1t of Political 3mI 
Security COllneil Affairs of the United Nations Secretarial. served as 
Chairman at all the sessions. 
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I. EFFECrS OF THE POSSIBLE USE 
OF NUCLEAII WEAPONS 
I NTRODUCTIO N 
I . The enormity of the shadow which is cast over mankiud by the 
!,o .. sibility of Iluclcar war makes it essential that its effects Uc: dearly 
and widely understood. It is not enough to know that nuclear weapon:; 
add a completely new dimension to man's powers of destruction. Pub-
lished estimates of the effects of nuclear weapons range all the way from 
the concept of the total destruct ion of humanity to the belief that a 
nuclea r war would diffe r frOIll a conventional conflict, not in kind, but 
only in sca le. The situation, however, is not as <lrbitrary as oppo~iug 
generalizations such as these might sllggeSt. There is one incscap .. "Iblc 
<I !ld basic fact. It is that the Iluclear ar mour ics \\"hich arc in being already 
comain large megaton weapons everyone of which has a dcstructi"e 
power greater than that of all the conventional cxplosi\'e that has cver 
beell used ill warfare since the day gunpowder was disco\·ered. \\'erc 
!iuch weapons ever 10 be used in lIumbers, hundreds of millions of people 
might be killed, and civilization ;IS we know it. as well as organized 
cOlllLmmity lifc, would ine"itably comc 10 an eud in the countries invoh'cJ 
in 1he conflict. l\ lany of those who su r"i"cd the immediate c1eslrtlction, 
as wcJl as others in countries out side the area of conflict, wou ld he 
exposed to widely-spreading radio-active contamination, and would 
suffer from 100lg-term effects of irradiation and transmit, to their off-
spring, a genetic burden wh ich would become manifest in the liisabilities 
of later generations. 
2. These general propositions, whether ~e t out liispassionately in 
scient ific studies or directed as propaganda, have been proclaimed so 
often that their force has all but been lost through repetition. But their 
reality is none the less so stark that, unless the facts on which Ihey are 
based are clearly set out, it will nOI be possible to realize the per il in 
which mankind now stands. 
3. The purpose of the first section of this report is to providc a 
picture of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and of the conse-
quences of their use. It gives a brief accou nt of the destruction wrought 
in Hi roshima and Nagasaki by the explosion of single and relatively 
small nuclear weapons. These two disasters arc the only examples of the 
actual use of nuclear weapons in war, and they provide direct infonna-
tion about the kind of casualties caused by nuclear explosions. The first 
section also outlines some theoretical studies of the physica l effects of 
mw.:h larger nuclear weapons on tent res of pOJlulatioll and on the 
civilian economy, as well as the effcct such weapons would have on major 
military targets. It deals too with the implications of so-called tactital 
nuclear warfare. that is to say of field warfare in which nuclear weapons 
are used. To achieve a measure of realism, most of these studies were 
related to actual, as opposed to hypothetical geographic,, ] areas, towns 
or cities, that is to say cities with a particular pattern of public services. 
communications and food supply. In a widespread exchange of strategic 
nuclea r weapons many cities would suffer devastation similar to that of 
the examples studied, with a cumulative interacting effect which would 
greatly exceed the simple addition of the dircct result s of individual 
attacks. Accepti ng that an attacker could always have the advantage over 
a defender in terms of surprise and weight of attack, no attempt has been 
made to complicate the general story by analysi ng the extent to which an 
ABM defence , together with civil defence measures, might reduce the 
scale of damage and the number of casualties which would result from a 
nuclear attack. It is enough to note that there is no active defence system 
in sight which would pre,'ent all nuclear weapons frOlll reaching their 
selected targets. 
4. Some tedmical details and general characteristics of nuclear 
explosions are set out in annex I to this section. The genetic effects of 
nuclea r radiation are discussed in annex II . 
HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI 
Physical effects 
5. The first atom ic bomb to be used in warfare had a yidd of 
nearly twenty kilotons, that is to say it had an explosive force equivalcnt 
to nearly 20,CXXI tons of conventional chemical explosive (e.g., TNT ). 
It was detonated at approximately 550 metres above Hiroshima on 
6 August 1945. On 9 August a second atomic device, with a similar yield, 
was detonated at about the same height over Nagasaki. In Hiroshima, 
destruction was concentric around the centre of a spreading city whose 
population was about 3OO,CXXI. Within seeonds, a rapidly growing fire-
1>..11 developed into a Illushroom-l ike cloud. supported, as it wcre, 0 11 a 
column of black smoke, and the heat radiating frolll the fire-ball caused 
thousands of fires. 
6. By comparison with Hiroshima, Nagasaki was a narrow city 
surrounded by hills and open to the sea in only one direction. with a 
population of about 87,000 people living within three kilometres from the 
centre. The immediate effects of the explosion were the same, but the 
area of destruction and fire differed in accordance with the different 
layout of the cities. In both cases the heat of the explosion was so intense 
that, up to a distance of about a half kilometre fr OIll the centre of lhe 
disaster, the surface of domestic ceramic roof tiles melted and fi ring of 
domestic wooden houses, by direct radiation, was observed up to one and 
a half kilometres. 
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7. There arc varying estimates of the casualties' in Hi roshima and 
Kagasaki and it has proved difficult to estimate the exact numbers of 
exposed people who Illay have died after escaping from the city. Avail-
able estimates arc that 78,(X)() were killed and 84,(X)() injured in Hiro-
~ hil11a, and that 27,(X)() were killed and 41,(X)() injured in Nagasaki. [n 
addition . there were thousands missing in both towns. ~Iost of the 
immediate fatal casualties wc re c.'l.used by the \'iolent disruption of resi-
dential and office buildings. In Hiroshima 6O,(X)() houses were completely 
or partially destroyed. Wooden houses within two and a half kilometres 
radius were carried away, while brick bltildings were turned into heaps 
of rubble. Severe damage to houses occurred as far out as eight 
ki lometres. Walls, doors, bricks, glass, furniture and other debris hurtled 
through the air, crushing or damaging c\'erything il1 their way. Mode r-
ately close to "ground-zero", by which is meant the point on the ground 
directly below the explosion, buildings were pushed O\'er llOdily, and at 
grea ter distances were leaning away from the source of the blast. 
S. No c.'(act information is available concerning the relative impor-
tance of blast, burns and nuclear radiation as the causes of fatali ties in 
these hombings. Burn injuries constituted the major problem in medical 
care. People exposed in the open had been severely burned . injuries from 
direct radiation being incu rred as far out as about two kilometres from 
the centre of the zone of destruction. From the day after thc bombing, 
hu rns accounted fo r about one half of all the deaths. At the Kameyama 
Hospital in Hiroshima 53 per cent of the patients who received burns at 
011 e. kilometre died within the fi rst week and i5 per cent within two 
weeks. The peak mortality occurred on the fourth day. Allother peak 
in deaths occur red in the third and the fourth week, when complications, 
especially those associated with radiation injury, sct in. Twenty days 
afte r the attack it was found that. among burned survivors, the great 
majority (80-90 per cent) had suffered "flash" burn::. from the immediate 
absorption of the thermal radiation of the explo~ioll on the cxposed skin: 
SOI11C 5-15 per cent had suffered both Rash and flame burns; a \'cry few 
(2-3 per cent) had suffered flame burns only. 
9. The explo.!>ion over Hiroshima rapidly led to a fireSlorll1~ which 
lasted for about six hOUTS and which burned out an area of twel\'e 
~quare kilometres of the 10WI1. \\' ilhin about I WO to three hours a wind, 
which started twenty mi nutes after the delonation of the bomb, reached 
a velocity of fifty to s ixty kilometres per hOl1r, blowing towards thc 
burning city [rom a1l directions. Seventy per cent of the fire-fighting 
machines in Fire Brigade stations \\'ere rendered unusahle, and 80 per 
1 The population and casualty figures referred to arc taken from public :1.1)-
l1(1Ullccments of local gO~'erlllllents in Hiroshima and Ka~asaki. six m011lhs aftcr 
lhe ('l{plo~ions, based Oil reports b) the sur.ey mission of the National Rcsearch 
Council, Jap;m. 
'A fircstorm is not a special characteristic of nuckar eXll lnsiOll. It mal be a 
consequence of a fort'st fire or an incendiary bomb attack, with hil!h inward \\inds 
Ilroduced largely by the updraft of tht htated air o\'cr an extensile burlling area. 
Tht incidence of firestorll\S is t!tpcnd .. nt 011 conditiOIl~ :1' the time of the attack. 
including the loc;11 :ll'ail;Lbi lit) of fud. 
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ccnt of the fire-fighting persollnel were unable to respond 10 the emer-
gency. The loss of water pressure through the breaking of pipes, mainly 
due to the collapse of buildings, contributed greatly to the additional 
destruction by fire. But even if men and machines had survived the blast, 
many fires would have beell inaccessible within one and a half kilometres 
from ground-zero. 
10. About 45,000 uf the fatal caslialties in Hiroshima dic(l 0 11 the 
day of the explosion, and some 20,()(X) during the following four months, 
as a result of traumatic wounds, burns and radiation effects. There are 
no estimates of the numbers who may have died from the effects of 
induced radio-activity experienced during rescue work in the city. Most 
of the medical facilities in Hiroshima were in the devastated area of the 
city, and the methods adopted for treating casualties were conseq\lently 
far below standard. Difficulties were aggravated by shortage of supplies 
and equipment, and by the extraordinary demands made on crippled 
medical staffs. Next to immediate medical problems, the most serious 
cballenge to those who had survived the direct effects of the explosion, 
were problems of water supply, housing and food. Electrical distribution 
systems suffered severely, first by damage to overhead lines, and secondly 
by damage to switch gear and transformers caused by collapse of the 
structures in which they were located. To people who were not inl111edi-
ate casualties these difficulties compounded the profound psychological 
effects of the disaster of which they were part. E"en twenty yea rs after 
the bombings there is an e;-;cessive sensiti" it)' of the people to the thought 
of radiation hazard, leading to difficulties in obtainillg agreement about 
the siting of nuclear power plants. 
Long-term radialio,) cOeds 
II. Apart fr0111 the effects which ionizing radiation had on the 
immediate victims of the e;-;plosions, the survivors were also e.'<posed to 
the hazards of the radiation both in terms of latent disease occurring in 
the individual (somatic effeets) and of changes in hereditary material 
(genetic effects). It had been suspected for S0111e time that exposure to 
repeated moderate doses of nuclear radiation is conducive to leukaemia, 
a disease which is associated with a malignant over-production of wh ite 
blood cells. A study of the su rvivors of the two nuclear explosions, over 
Hirosh ima and Nagasaki, shows that the disease can undoubtedly result 
from a large single (acute) dose of radiation. The incidence of leukaemia 
in the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was observed 10 be increas-
ing in 1948. It reached a peak in 1950-1952. Although it seems to ha"e 
decreased somewhat since then, it still remains much higher than in the 
une.'<posed population of the rest of Japan. While the incidence of the 
disease increased in all age groups, it did so rather morc sharply in 
young people. The incidence in survivors was up to fifty limes greater 
in those within about one kilometre of the explosion than in people who 
Iyere further away. 11 was ten times greater for those within one and 
one and a half kilometres than for those between two and len kilOmetres 
from grOlllld-zero. 
12. A continu ing study of the su rvivors of the two Jap.1nese (lis-
asters has also suggested an increased incidence fo r other kinds of malig-
nant cancer, particularly cancer of the thyroid, and not just leukaemia, 
which has a much shorter latent interval. There is also a hint, but as yet 
no more than a hint, that the average expectation of life is less in the 
survivors of the exposed population whether or not they suffered malig-
nant disease. This is an effect of radiation which has been proved in 
experimental animals. The indications are stronger that a significantly 
high proportion of the babies born to women who were pregnant when 
exposed to the explosion, and who survived, had he.1ds smaller than 
average size, and Ihat sollle of these suffered severe mental retardation. 
13. Insufficient time has passed since these two nuclear dis.1sters 
to determine what genetic changes, if any, were induced in the survivors. 
[n any case, although long-term genetic effects would indeed be conse-
quences of radiation in nuclear wariare, such effects arc of prime concern 
only where the acute effects can be disregarded, i.e., in areas far removed 
from the immediate target areas in a nuclear war or under couditions of 
intense testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Hence for the pur-
pose of this report, it has not been tho\lght necessary to discu!>s fully the 
present state of knowledge about the genetic effects of ionizing radiation. 
Some facts concerning these effects are given in annex II. All that need 
be noted here is that radiation from nuclear explosions can cause genetic 
mutations and chromosomc anomalies which may 1e.1d to serious physical 
and mental disabil ities in future gencrations. These effects may arise 
either from the radiation released in the first few in<;tallts after a nuclear 
explo!>ion or from that released through the later radio-acti"e decay of 
the substances contai ned in "fall-oul" frllm Ihe explosion. In this con-
nexion it should be 1l0ted that there was 110 sign ificant local fall -ou l in 
either lliroshima or Nagasaki si llce. in hoth cases, the e:-.;:plosions oc-
curred fairly high in the atlllosphere. 
TUE SIGNa'ICANCE OF TilE l'OSSI1II.I<: USE OF NUCI .. E,\R 
WEAI'ONS IN "'UTURE W,\RS 
14. In all wars, advancing armies have sought to capture vital 
enemy objecti"es, such as cities, illdu~tr i al zones and food producing 
areas, as well as to command the transport system linking them. Air 
warfare has made it possible to attack and destroy such targets without 
first defeating the defending armies. The obliteration of the di~tinctioll 
between the "front" or the "rear" of a war zone, which came abolll as a 
result of the air offensives of the Second ·World \Var, has now been 
compounded by the advent of nuclear weapons. Those who defined the 
two Japanese targets for the fir:.t and onl)' atomic bombs yet used in war 
held that the bombs should he used so as to cre.1te Ihe maximum psycho-
logical ellect, and thus break the will of the Japanese people to continue 
the fight. Some present-day military theorists who write about nuclear 
war speak of attacks 0 11 cities taking place simultaneously with, or even 
before. attacks on armed forces and specific military targets. 
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15. It is therefore necessary to build up a picture of what would 
happen if a large city were attacked not with kiloton weapons of the 
kind used on the two Japanese cities but with the much more powerful 
hydrogen bombs or fusion bombs which are available now and whose 
yield is usually expressed in megatons, i.c., unit yields cquivalent to one 
million tons of chemical explosive. Because of the nature of nuclear 
weapons all thcir sep..uate destructive effects, whether immcdiate or 
delaycd, could never be maximized in a single explosion. For example, 
the areas affected by blast, thermal radiation and initial nuclear radiation 
would be appreciably smaller for a ground-burst than an air-burst of Ihe 
same energy yield. On the other hand, a ground-bu rst would be accom-
panied by early radio-active fall-out, which would be much less for an 
ai r-burst. \Vith air-bursts, the relative importance of the various effects 
would depend on the height of the burst. 
16. Sincc every city has its own individuality, its own pattern of 
services, communications and food supplies, a realistic picture of what 
would happen cannot be derived unless one considers a real city, and 
analyses the effects zone by zone, taking into account differences between 
them in population density, {unction and so on. One such study was 
made of a city, with a population of just over olle million people, which 
extended in all directions for about cight to ten kilometres (i.e., with a 
surface area of some 250 sq. kill. or about 100 sq. miles), and attacked, 
it was assumed, with a single one-mc!,'<lton nuclear weapon, burst at 
ground level. Using the e.'(perience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and 
estimating also on the basis of the results of carefully designed wcapons 
effects e.'(periments, the following figures of casualties emerged: 
Killed by blast and fire .... . ............................... . . 
Killed by radio-active fall-out .... . .......................... . 
Injured (of whom 15,000 were ill the arca of fall-out and thus 
exposed to the effects of radiation) ................. . 





17. Approximately one third of all the inhabitants would have been 
killed as a result of blast and fire or from a radiation dose received in the 
first two days. One third of a million dead is approximately the same 
!lumber of civilians who were killed by air raids both in Gennany and in 
jap'lIl during the whole of the Second World War. Practically alt the 
inhabitants of the central area of the city, an area of about six by five 
kilometres, would have been killed. mainly as a result of thc destruction 
caused by blast and fire. Any who were not immediately killed in the 
central area would have died from nuclear radiation . At the outer 
boundary of the central area (hatched area, figure 1) the proportion of 
casualties in the population would fall to 75 per cent, and would then 
continue to faU as the distance from the burst increased. Most of the 
9O,(X)() of the city's population who would have suffered non-letha l 
injuries would have becn serious casualties, and, for 15 to 20 per cent 
of these, rescue operations would have been greatly impedcd by radio-
active fall -out. I n the part of the population who, in this particular 
6 
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FIGURE 1. CASUALTIES 
(within cify boundary) 
Distribution 0/ casualtits 
B 
5 km 
A i! a line enclosing central area 6 X 5 km where practically the whole popula-
tion would have been killed 
B is a line through a point 2.5 km west of bomb-burst marking limit of fall-out 
C marks area inside which a person would ha,'e received a lethal dose from 
fall-out in 48 hours if he had stayed in the open 
analysis, were not counted as casualties, 20 per cent would have been 
subject to radio-active fall-out hazards. Only half of the total population 
in the city would have been both uninjured and unaffected by fall-out 
(figure II) . 
18. The scale of the physical destruction which would be associated 
with casualties of this order of magnitude is so great that there is no 
basis of experience which could sen'e to help describe the instantaneous 
trau sformatiOIl of a vast living city into a sea of blazi ng rubble. Every 
house or building would be damaged; about one third would be COIU-
pletely wrecked, i.e .. with damage ranging from ulter and complete 
obliteration, to buildings with more than half their walls down; another 
one third would be severely damaged, i.e., wrecked for all practical pur-
7 
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poses, but perhaps providing some temporary shelter if nothing else were 
available. Only about one third of the original houses would be in any 
way serviceable, although they would have lost a great p.'lrt of their 
roofs, doors and windows (figure 111 ) . In many areas, water and gas 
mains, sewers, and power supplies would have been destroyed. Not a 
single area would have retained all its essential services (figure IV ) . 
Ro..ds would have been erased and c\'en the lightly damaged peripheral 
areas would very likely l>c depri,red of their water supplies and sources 
of food supply. It is all but impossible to conceive of the amount of 
improvisation and reorg:H1ization which would be demanded from the 
shocked survi"ors in the period immediately following the attack, even 
though every possible plan had been made to deal with the anticipated 
results of a possible st rike. 
19, Against this background of death, injury, destruction and fire , 
olle c.'ln sec the whole life of a great city being completely disrupted by 
the explosion of a single megaton bomb. As an orgunized unit, c.'lpable of 
contributing to a war effort, it would cease to have any meaning. The 
survh·ors in different parts of the city would either l>c in a state of 
shocked immobility or would be wandering about trying to find some 
place better than the one where they happened to be when the bomb went 
off, searching for food. for better shelter, for relatives. for help of any 
8 
F1GURl. III. En'ECT OF A GROUN~DURST MEGATON 110MB ON ACCOMMODATION 
Usable 
Wrecked 
-· .... "'''-111 
Burnt out 
kind. The problems confronting the community would be immeasurably 
greater than any experience of the Second World War. In hostile cir-
cumstances of the kind we are assuming, it would be unrealistic to sup-
pose that only one city would be struck. With many in the same 
desperate plight, there could be no question of ally substantial help 
being brought to the survivors from outside. In brief, a big city of the 
size that hlls been described. a city in which more than a million people 
lived in lln area of about 250 sq. km. would for all practical purposes be 
eliminated by a single one-megaton weapon ground-burst near its centre. 
One-megaton bombs are slllall units in the megaton spect rum ; larger 
weapons, much larger ones, are now stockpiled. 
Radio-active cotltami,wtioll 
20. Close to the explosion the lethal effects of radiation would be 
instantaneous. nut nuclear weapon explosions also give rise to radio-
active fission products and, in the case of a ground-burst, these become 
mixed with earth particles sucked into the atmosphere. The heavier 
particles of soil and weapon debris fall back to the ground and settle in 
the vicinity of the explosion, giving rise to delayed radiation hazards. 
These particles consti tute local radio-active fall-out. For a ground-burst 
of the type assumed in the foregoing paragraphs. the area of intense 
fall-out could cover hundreds of square kilometres. \Vithin stich an area, 
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people who were not adequately sheltered and who did not remai n under 
cover until the radio-acti\'ity of the fall-Ollt had decayed substantially 
would be exposed to intensities of radiation sufficient to produce very 
serious hazards to health. Figure V illustrates a fa ll--out pattern in the 
amount of nuclear radiation which an individual would recei\'e in rads 
per hour for an idealized case of one particular wind speed, in a given 
di rection, following a one-megaton explosion at ground level. Beyond 
the area of intense fall --oUl there would be a very much larger zone 
where sign ificant intensi ties of radiation would be e.'(perienced and 
where a proportion of the people who were exposed would still be at 
ri sk. (For significance of irradiation doses, see annex I, table 4.) 
21. The pictu re painted in paragraphs 16-19 was derived , as 
already observed, from a detailed analysis of an actual city, taking into 
accoullt its true layout, and the differential dist ribution of its population. 
If, instead, olle assumes the general case of a single megaton explosion at 
a height of about 3,000 metres rather than at ground level, over a hypo-
thetical city having a population of one million people who are e\'enly 
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dist ributed in a built-up area of twenty by twenty kilometres, the follow-
ing general conclusions emerge: 
(a) W ithin a radius of about three kilometres from the e: .. plosion, 
all buildings would be destroyed and 90 per cent of those inhabiting the 
area would be casualties (dead and seriously injured); 
(b) W ithin a radius of three to six kilometres there would 1x-
partial or complete destruct ion of buildings, and 50 per cent of those 
inhabiting the area would be casualties. The survivors would have to be 
evacuated; 
(c) Within a radius of between six and nine kilomet res there would 
still be heavy destruction to buildings and about 35 per cent of the 
inhabitants would be casualties. 
22. It is estimated that 40 per cent of the total population of stich 
a city would be casualties as a result of blast and fire alone, and that 
60 per cent of the entire city would be destroyed. In addition, direct 
thermal radiation might cause burn casualties and fires as far as ten to 
fi fteen kilometres from grou nd-zero. 
23. For a ten-megaton explosion over such a hypothetical city, 
the area of complete or serious destruction would cover between 300 
and 500 sq. km., that is to say the area of the entire citro ).[ore-
over the effects of blast and direct rad iation would extend well beyond 
its boundaries, with heath and forest fires raging up to twenty kilo-
metres from the ground-zero of the explosion. Half of the entire popula-
tion over an area of radius of some twenty-five kilometres could be 
expected to die within the first few days as a result of radio-active con-
tamination, even after allowing for some shelte r provision. 
24. In the case of an air-burst of a twenty-megaton bomb the heat 
which would result would be intense enough to start fires as fa r as thi rty 
kilomet res from a point of detonation, depending on how clear the 
atmosphere was at the time, and could endanger the lives of people ill 
an area with a radius of nearly 60 kilometres. It has been estimated 
that such a device, if exploded over Manhattan, would, in the absence 
of shelter or evacuation programmes, probably kill G million out of 
New York City's 8 million inhabitants, and lead to an additional one 
million deaths beyond the eity limits. The surface explosion of a twenty-
megaton bomb would result in the formation of a crater 75-90 metres 
deep and 800 metres in diameter. (See reference 3 in annex I II.) 
ESTI MATE OF EFFECTS OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON A REGION OF A COUNTRY 
25. A study was made of the likely results of a nuclear attack 0 11 a 
hypothetical industrial region, consisting of nine cities each with popula-
tions of over 50,000 inhabitants (some weJl over ), and also containing 
140 smaller towns of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants (about sixty of which 
contained elements of key indust ry). Assumi ng that a one-megaton bomb 
burst at grollnd level in each of the nine cities, the study showed that 
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cumulative estimates of casualties provided a vcry inaclequate measure 
of the over-all cffects of the attack. The estimates showed that 20 per 
cent of the total population, or 30 per cent of the urban population, or 
3S per cent of the key-industrial population would be killed. The houses 
destroyed would be 30 per cent of total, or 40 per cent of urban, or 
50 per cent of those occupied by key-industrial population. But cities 
arc not isolated entities; they are linked in a variety of functional ways, 
being dcpendent on each othcr for raw materials of different kinds, as 
well as fo r semi-finished and fini shed manufactured goods. Taking the 
interaction of effects into account, the study showed that the percentage 
of key industry in the whole region (i.e., industry with more than loc.li 
significance) which would be brought to a stop would be bet" .. een 70 per 
cCnt and 90 per cent of the whole. The lowcr figure of 70 per cent takes 
account of e\'erything dire<:tly dest royed or completcly disrupted insidc 
the targct cities: the higher figure of 90 per cent includes the areas 
surrounding the city which would also be indirectly "knocked out" 
through, for cxample, failure of communications or supplics of raw mate-
rials and food. The more intcrdependent thcy are, thc largcr is thc multi-
plying factor one has to bea r in mind when estimating the cumulative 
effects oi the dest ruction of single cities. 
26. Another more general study envisaged a nuclear attack on a 
small country, extending about 1,000 km in one direction and 500 km in 
the other, i.c., with an area of SOO,CXX> sq. kill. and a population density 
of 100 people per sq. km. It was assumed that one pa rt of the country 
was attacked with four nuclear weapons each of twenty megatons. Such 
an attack would affect about 100,000 sq . km., or some 20 per cent of the 
count ry's total expanse by blast, radiation and radio-active contamina-
tion. The Q\'cr-all consequcnccs of the deva station would vary according 
to the nature of the particular area attackcd, e.g., according to whether 
it contained kcy cities, sources of electric power, raw materials or 
whethcr it was a prime food-producing arca. But in every case, economic 
life would be completcly disrupted and the gencral devastation, including 
radio-active contamination from low bursts would be such as to prevent 
any immediate assistance being brought to the devastated areas from out-
side. In hypothctical studics of this kind it has also been estimated that 
in the absence of special protection, blast-induced deaths alone resulling 
from high level 400 ten-megatoll bombs aimed at United States metro-
politan areas, would eliminate more than half of the total American 
population of sollie 200 million people. E\'en if they were all in substan-
tial {all-out shelters the same proportion would be killed if the weapons 
were burst at ground level. 
27. A Swedish study of the conse(luences of nuclear aUacks against 
Swedish cities showed that an attack carried out with about 200 weapons, 
ranging from 20 kilotons to 200 kilotons in yield, would result in 2 to 
3 million casualties, i.e., 30 to 40 per cent of the tOLl l population of about 
7 million people. It also showed that between 30 to 70 per cent of 
Swedish industry would be destroyed, and that about two thirds of the 
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industrial workers would receive fatal or 5Cvere injuries. The weight of 
attack assumed in this particular silidy is relatively heavy, but none the 
less it corresponds to only a small fraction of the nuclear weapons that 
are already stockpiled in nuclear arsenals. 
28. Swedish studies have also shown that the degree of protection 
against radio-active fall-out which might be provided by existing build-
ings in urban and rural areas in Sweden varies greatly. In no region 
would existing buildings provide adequate protection against the higher 
levels of radiation which could be experienced in the intense part of the 
fall-out area. But effective protection might be provided over the greater 
part of the fall-out area, given there had been time to construct shelters, 
and to stock thcm wilh food and ot her necessities of life. Even ordinary 
buildings, if they remain standing, do provide some protection from the 
radiation caused by fall-out. 
29. In addition to a need to protect against c.xternal residual nuclear 
radiation, i.e., radiation emitted later than one minute after a Tluclear 
e:ICplosion, there is the further hazard of internal radiation resulting 
from the ingestion of :lIIy radio-active fall-out material that had con-
taminated food, particularly vegetable food, and in some cases open 
water supplies. The amount of radio-active material which could be taken 
into the body by way of contaminated food would exceed that (rom the 
inhalation of contaminated air or absorption of contaminated water. The 
radio-activity of this absorbed material would decay by the emission of 
damaging Iluclear radiation. 
30. Urbanization clearly increases the haz..'\rd of radio-active con-
tamination because of the concentration of increasing numbers of inhabi-
tants in comparati\'ely small areas. This applies particularly in Europe. 
An analysis of about 100 European cities showed that while the larger 
cities are on average about thirty to fifty kilometres from each other, the 
smaller cities are on average no more than ten to fifteen kilometres 
apart. In Germany villages are on average only from one to two kilo-
metres apart. Radio-active contamination, despite a continuous decrease 
in intensity, would persist for years following a heavy nuclear attack, 
and would create continuing problems in food-producing areas and to 
water supplies. Figure Vl illustrates the possible far-ranging effeet of 
radio-active fall-out from a twenty-megaton explosion on Hamburg, 
while figure VI[ illustrates the similar consequences of a fifteen-megaton 
explosion on London (see annex I, table 4, for clinical effects of radiation 
doses). It has been calculated that a twenty-megaton explosion 0 11 the 
American city of Boston would cause sllch a degree of fall-out over an 
area with a radius of nearly fifty kilometres that half of the unsheltered 
people on the fringe of this area would die within forty-cight hours. 
Even if shelters were provided, high doses of radiation might be received 
which, even if not falal, could still produce extensh'e radiation sickness, 
as well as long-term somatic and genctic effects. 
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EH'ECTS ARt SING FROM THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
IN FIELD WARFARE 
31. In certain quarters it is still military doctrine that any disparity 
in the conventional strength of opposing forces could be redressed by 
using nuclear weapons in the zone of battle, This proposition needs to be 
considered first in the context that both sides possess these weapons, 
and second when the situation is asymmetrical and only one side is a 
nuclear weapons Power, Se<:tion III of this report deals with the latter 
case, In the former, where the situation is symmetrical, carefully con-
ducted and dispassionate theoretical studies of the lise of nuclear weapons 
in field warfare, including analyses of an extensive series of "war games" 
relating to the European theatre, have led to the clcar conclusion that 
this military doctrine could lead to the usc of hundreds, and not of tens, 
of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in the battlcfield area, given that 
both sides resort to their use, Without going into the details of these 
studies, it can be firmly stated that, were nuclear weapons to be used in 
this way, they could lead to the devastation of the whole battle zone, 
IS 
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Almost everything would be destroyed ; forests would be razed to the 
ground and only the strongest buildings would escape total destruction. 
Fires would be raging e\·erywhere. Circumstances such as these would 
be incompatible with the cont inued conduct of military operations within 
the zones of devastation. 
32. An offensive on the scale to which all these stud ies point, over a 
land battle area with a front of, say, 250 kill and SO kill deep, would 
render hundreds of thousands, even millions, homeless. Such a level of 
destruction could be achieved with only 100 smaJl nuclear weapons in a 
European battle area chosen because it did not contain any large towns. 
\ -Yith 400 weapons, which is not an unreasonably large number if both 
sides used nuclear weapons in a battle zone, the physical damage caused 
would correspond to somethi ng like six times that caused by all the 
bombing of the Second World War- and all sustained in a few days 
rather than a few years. If one sets aside the profound, even if unquanti-
liable psychological effects of such an exchange, the resulting chaos would 
still be beyond imagination. 
33. The estimates show that with 100 weapons having an average 
yield of thirty kilotons (range 5 10 SO kilotons) about one tenth of the 
assumed typical European batt le area would be completely devastated, 
and about one quarter severely damaged. \Vilh 2(X) weapons about one 
fifth would be devastated and half of it severely damaged; and with 400 
weapons about one third of the area would be devastated and all severely 
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damaged. Even for only 100 strikes, this represents destruction 011 an 
unimaginable scale over an area of about 12,500 sq. kill. In another 
European "war-game" study, a lxtttle was envisaged in which the two 
opposing sides together used ..... eapons whose total yield was between 
twenty and twenty-fIve megatons, ill not fewer than 500 and in not Illore 
than 1,000 strikes. The nuclear weapons were supposed to have been used 
against military targets only, in an area of about 25,0Cl0 sq. km. In this 
engagement aLout 3.5 million people would have had thei r homes 
destroyed if the weapons had been air-burst, and 1.5 million if the 
weapons had been ground-burst. In the former case, at least half of the 
people concerned would have been fatally or seriously injured. In the 
case of ground-burst weapons, 1.5 million would have been e.xposed to 
lethal doses of radiation and a further 5 million to the hazard of con-
siderable although non-lethal doses of radiation. 
34. A question which inunediately poses itself is whether military 
operations would be compatible with destruction of thc scale indicated by 
estimates such as these, A vast civilian population would be involved 
unless thc battle took place in desert conditions. Thc number of casual-
ties, civilian and military, cannot be easily related, in any precise way, 
to the population actually in lhe area at the time of the lxtttle. Bec.'luse 
the need to reduce the level of military casualties would dictate tactics 
of dispersal, the number of nuclear strikes necessary to produce asswncd 
military results would go up very rapidly. Fear and terror, I>oth in the 
civil and military population, might overwhelm the situation. 
35. Military planners have no past experience on which to call for 
any guide as to how military operations could proceed in circumstances 
such as these. When such levels of physical destruction arc reached , one 
might well ask what would determine the course of a nucle.'lr battle? 
Would it be the number of enemy casualties? Would it be the violent 
psychological reaction, fear and terror, to the horror of widespread 
instantanCOIlS destruction? Would the chaos immediately bring all mili-
tary operations 10 a halt? Whatever the answer to these questions, it is 
clear enough that the destruction and disruption which would result from 
so-called tactical nuclear war would hardly differ from the effe(:ts of 
strategic war in the area concerned. The concept of escalation 
from tactical to strategic nuclear war could have no possible meaning in 
an area within which field warfare was being waged with nuclear 
weapons. 
36. Thi s picture is not altered if one postulates so-called "clean" 
nuclear weapons, in place of those which formed the basis o[ the fore-
going studies. Claims have been made about the possiiJilities of providing, 
for lxtttlef1eld usc, low yield weapons (say I to 10 kilotons) which would 
release an abnormally high proportion of their energy in blast and 
nuclear radiation, while producing virtually no radio-acli\'c fall-out. 
"Clean", in this context, is a matter of degree. These suggested weapons 
would basically rely 011 a fission reaction so that radio-active fall-out 
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could never be completely avoided.!! In any case, the foregoi ng studies 
postulated nuclear explosions which yielded minimal radio-acti ve con-
tamination from normal fission weapons. The resulting chaos in the 
battlefield area was brought about, not by fall-out, but prima rily through 
blast effects. Thus, if ;'clean" weapons were ;l\'ailable fo r battlefield usc 
it is difficult to believe that similar chaos would not ultimately be pro-
duced. Sooner or later lhe battlerleld sitU;ll ioll mllst be expected to 
hecome simi lar to that which the foregoing stud ies ha\'e indicated. 
blterdiclioll targets 
37. Were such weapons e,'er to l:oe used in a war, it is also quite 
certain that they would not be restricted to the battle zone itself-even 
if it were assumed that there would not be what is usually referred to as 
a st rategic exchange. It is part of the concept of tactical nuclear warfare 
that in a purely military campaign they would also be used ol\tside the 
area of contact in order to impede the movement of enemy forces, the 
operation of air forces and so all. The objectives which would be attacked 
ill order to achieve these effects are generally called interdiction targets. 
Theoretical studies of operat ions of this kind provide a picture of "deep" 
nuclear strikes whose effects would be hardly distinguishable from a 
strategic nuclear exchange in which both sides set out from the start to 
destroy each other's major centres of population. To illustrate what is 
implied, reference can be made to a si ngle strike in one such study in 
which it was assumed that the railway installations in a major transport 
centre were attacked by a single twenty-kiloton bomb, or a single 100-
kiloton bomb, in order to make the centre impassable to troops and 
supplies, and thereby to assist the land battle elsewhere. The railway 
centre chosen for this study was a city with 70,()(X) inhabitants living in 
23,0Cl0 houses in an area of some fifty sq. km. The bomb was assullled 
to be burst at ground level so as to maximize the effects on the railway 
lines. T his Illo<le of attack, unlike that used against the Japanese cities, 
would at the sallle tillle also maximize local fall-out damage. \Vith the 
twenty-kiloton bomb, railway tracks would be demolished over a length 
of about 100 metres, a large alllount of spoi l frolll the crater would cover 
all lines in the vicinity, block:.tge would be caused by the collapse of road 
bridges, rail flyovers and buildings out to about a half~mile from the 
burst. All fuel depots and servicing ~heds wo\11d be destroyed. With a 
loo-kiloton bomb the scale of damage would, of course, be greater; about 
one mile of t rack would be destroyed or blocked by heavy debris, and 
the main roads through the town would be completely blocked. The 
problem of reopening a road or railway would be hampered by a vast 
'The same wou ld apply to larger so-called "clean" \\capons used in a st ra te-
gic role. In this case there would in additioll be considerable induced radio·activity 
caused by the captu re of neutrons in atmospheric nitrogen, thus producing ver) 
long-lived radio·active carbon·14. So far ,IS long-range and long-term fall-Qut is 
concerned, this radio-active hazard from so-called "cle'LIl" weapons is comparable 
in importance to that from less "clean" wca(lOtls. (The foot·note to annex [, 
para. 7, applies also to "clean" weapoIiS.) 
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amount of radio~aclive debris. It would indeed he so great that it would 
almost certainly be easier to build a new by~pass round the town. If 
such attacks formed part of a general "intcrdiction" programme of bOlllb~ 
ing, it stands to reason that the t ransport communication system of ,. 
country could be totally wrecked in a very short time, and with it much 
more as wei\. 
38. The estimated inescapahle collateral effects of bombing a single 
railway centre ill sHch a programme of attacks indicate that Illost of the 
industrial and commercial property in the midd le of the tOWll would have 
been destroyed. Fire would have consumed not only houses but also the 
larger buildings and factories not immediately destroyed by the explo~ 
sion. A twel1ty~kiloton bomb in an "interd iction" attack on a town which 
was a communications centre-and few, if any comlllllllieation centres 
are not towns-would kill about a quarter of the 70,000 inhabitants, 
while a l OO~kilotol1 attack would kiU abont half. The survivors \Voul tl 
have to contend with the same ki nd of situation as has been depicted in 
the case of the two Jap.1nesc cities bombed in 1945, or the larger city 
attacked by a one-megaton weapon which has been described above. A 
programme of "interdiction" attacks on targets behind the zonc of con~ 
tact of opposing armies, if such a programme included communicat ion 
centres as well as airfields, supply depots, armament factories and so on, 
would be no different in its effects from those of a widespread so~called 
strategic nuclear exchange between two opposing Powers. 
D ETERRENCE OF WAR 
39. Nuclear we<lpons consti tute one of the domi nant facts of modern 
world politics. T hey are at present deployed in thousands by the nuclear 
weapon Powers, with warheads ranging frorn kilotons to megatons. 'A'e 
have al reacJy witnessed the experimental explosion of a fifty to sixty~ 
megaton bomb, i.e .. of a weapon with about 3,000 times the power of 
the bomb used in 1945 against Japan. I-Il1ncJred~megatoJl devices. 
weapons about 5,000 times the size of those used in 1945, are no more 
difficult to devise. They couk] be exploded just outside the atmosphere of 
any coulltry, in order utterly to destroy hundreds, even thousands, of 
square kilomet res by means of blast and spreading fire. It has been sug~ 
gested on good authority that in certain geographical circumstances 
multi~megaton weapons could also be exploded in ships near coastlines 
in order to create enormOllS tidal wa\'es which would engulf the coastal 
belt. 
40. The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it 
started, could 110t be confined to the Powers engaged in that war. They 
themselves would ha\'e to suffer the im1llediate kind of destruction and 
the immediate and more enduring lethal fal1~out whose effects have 
already been desc ribed. But neigl1bouring coulltries, and even countries 
in parts of the world remote from the actual connict, could soon become 
exposed to the hazards of radio~activc fall-out prccipitated at great dis~ 
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tances from the explosion, after moving through the allllo~phere as a 
vast cloud. Thus, at least within the same hemisphere, an enduring 
radio-act ive hazard could exist for distant as well as close human J>opula-
lions, through the ingestion of foods derived irom contaminated vegeta-
tion, and the exlernal irradiation due to fall-out particles deposited on 
the ground. The extent and nature of the hazard would depend upon the 
numbers and type of bombs exploded. Given a sufficient number, no part 
of the world would escape exposure to biologically significant levels of 
radiation. To a greater or lesser degree, a legacy of genet ic damage could 
be incurred by the world's I>opuiation. 
41. It is to be expected that no major nuclear Power could attack 
another without provoking a nuclear counter-attack. It is even possible 
that an aggressor could suffer more in retaliation than the nuclear 
Power it first attacked. In this lies the concept of deterrence by the threat 
of nuclear destruction. Far from an all-out nuclear exchange being a 
rational action which could ever be justified by any set of conceivable 
political gains, it may be that no country would, in the pursuit of its 
political objectives, deliberately risk the total destruction oi its own 
capital city, leave alone the destruction of all its major centres of popula-
tion ; or risk the resultant chaos which would leave in doubt a govern-
ment's ability to remain in cont rol of its people. But the fact that a state 
of mutual nuclear deterrence prevails between the Super Powers does 
not, as we know all too well, pre\·elll the outbreak of wars with conven· 
tional weapons involving ooth nuclear and llon-nuclear weapon nations; 
the risk of nuclear war remains as long as there are nuclear weapons. 
42. The basic facts about the nuclear bomb and its use are harsh 
and terrifying for civilization; they have become lost in a mass of 
theoretical verbiage. It has been claimed that the world has learnt to live 
with the bomb; it is also said there is no need for it to drift un necessarily 
into the pos ition that it is prepared to die for it. The ultimate question 
for the world to decide in our nuclear age-and this applies both to 
nuclear and non-nuclear Powers-is what short-term interests it is pre-
pared to s..,crifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security. 
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II. ECONmUC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION 
AND FURTHEH DEVELOP~1ENT OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
43. Concern about the development and proliferation of nuclear 
weapons stems not only from the C<'llamitous effects of possible use but 
from the consciousness that the immense resources devoted to their pro-
duction CQuld instead be used, according to the expressed aim of the 
United Nations, "to promote social progress and better standa rds of life 
in larger freedom".4 
44. To understand Ihe economic implications of embarki ng on the 
development of a nuclea r armoury it is necessary to become clear about 
the volume and kind of resources such a step demands. The evaluation 
needs to be in terms not only of the physical and financial resources 
absorbed but of the opportunities foregone through devoting these re-
sources to destructive weapons. It is not easy to come by some of the 
relevant information, and no estimates can be better than illustrative. 
45. Any gi\'cn size of effort will have economic implications which 
differ according to the nuclear and industrial base from which the pro-
gramme sta rt s. ~'Ioreover, a penalty of the arms race is that no size of 
programlllC ever satisfies. Even if it became possible to set a limit to an 
arsenal of nuclear warheads, their delivery systems and the defence of 
their bases can absorb effort indefinitely. 
46. The magnitude and timing of any programme depends on the 
base of the cou ntry's scientific, technical and industrial capability. 
47. Scientific and technical capability determines the country's 
ability to undertake the problems of : 
(a) P roduction of fissile and other material to meet the necessary 
st rict specifications; 
(b) Warhead assembly and testing; 
(c) Development and control of the delive ry vehicles, whether 
missile or aircraft units in an effective operating system. 
It involves personnel represented by physicists, chemists, metallurgists, 
mathematicians, engineers, skilled machine tool operators, electricians, 
pipefitlers, welders, sheet-metal workers, furnace and chemical plant 
t Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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operators, instrument makers and fabricators, who are essential for 
manufacture and assembly of components to the scientific specifications. 
48. Industrial capability is measured by the country's established 
experience in fields of advanced technology, such as nuclear energy, avia-
tion, electronics and space tech nology. 
49. In arriving at the cost figures presented below, countries pos· 
sessing the above capabilities have been used as a basis, ami it is there· 
fore to be expected that costs would be considerably higher fo r countr ies 
which arc less developed and have to devote major efforts to establishing 
these basic prerecluisites. It should also Uc remembered that whereas the 
development of nuclear am1ament by an industrially developed country 
may mean diverting resou rces from work that improves a standard of 
life already rather high, the same development on the part of an indus· 
Irially developing count ry may have to be done at the expense of the 
basic economic needs of a substantial fraction of the population. 
50. The estimated costs, supported by some actual figures, for a 
first generation of simple nuclear warheads together with an unsophisti. 
caled delivery-vehicle system indicate that the acquisition of such a 
system may be within the reach of a number of nations. These cost 
figures, however, bear hardly any credibility as representing a limit last-
ing for any signi ficant time, even for an indust rialized country. The 
reasoning is that after having acquired the initial unsophisticated nuclear 
weapons system, the need to develop less vulnerable and more sophisti-
cated delivery systems seems certain to be felt in order to secu re the mili-
tary and political object ives of the force. It thus seems lhat the total costs 
of acquiring a nuclear we.'pons system over, say, ten years are liable 
under certain circumstances to be closer to the costs gi\'en for the French 
and United Kingdom s)'Slems up to 1%9, namely, $8.000 million to 
$9,000 million Ihan to the $1,700 million to $2,000 million derived be· 
low fo r an unsophisticated system. (Any system employing unorthodox 
means of delivery, such as a ship or commercial aircraft, has been ruled 
out as not a viable course for any nation to pursue.) 
51. The dctail that follows, supported uy annex IV, shows, on the 
one hand, that the cost of produci ng the weapons can probably be esti-
mated with fair accuracy, at least in countries with developed peaceful 
nuclea r activities. On the other hand, experience has shown that the 
major pa rt of the cost of a nuclear force is that of the delivery systems 
and, in particular, of the missiles, and these arc liable to vcry large over-
runs and continuing costly development. 
52. The indigenous development of a nuclear weapon capability is 
thus scen to demand not only major fi nancial resources but very highly 
specialized human resources that are liable to be even more significant. 
BASte COSTS OF NUCLE,\R WARUEAOS 
53. The three fissile materials suitable for use as nuclear explosives 
are uraniul11-23S, plutonium-239 and uranium·233. U rani um-233 is still 
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rarc, so its cost has not been considered here. A kilogramme of natural 
uranium contains seven grammes of uranium-235, while the main com· 
ponent is uran ium-238. For use as a nuclear explosive the uranium·235 
has to be scparated and conccntratcd or "enriched" to 90-95 per cent of 
total uraniullI. The Cive nuclear weapons Powers have each established 
a capability for producing high ly enriched uranium·235. So far as is 
known only one process for uranium-235 isotope separation has been 
pllt into large-scale lise. h is known as the gaseous diffusion process and 
is applied to gaseous lITanium-hcxafluoride (UFe). This process requires 
large and costly plants b.,sed on an advanced technology which has not 
been fully disclosed. The total cost of the three United States plants was 
around $2,300 million, and the annual operating costs were estimated at 
from $500 million to $600 million, resulting in a cost of $11,000 to 
$12,000 per kilogramme of weapons-grade uTanium. Some twenty-five 
kilogrammes of this material would be required for the prodllction of one 
nuclear warhead with a yield in the twenty-kiloton range. Uranium-235 
is preferred O\'er plutonium for the production of thermonuclear weapons 
(H-bombs). 
54. Plutonium-239 results from exposing uranium·238 to neutrons 
in a nuclear reactor. It is estimated that some eight kilogrammes of 
95 per cent plutoniulll-239 would be needed for a nuclear warhead 
yielding a twenty-kiloton explosion. 
55. A complete plutonium-239 production complex would require 
plants for concentrating uranium ore, refining the uranium to high 
purity, and probably reducing it to metal ingot, and for fabricating 
reactor fuel , a nuclear reactor, a chemical plant for plutonium extraction 
and one for reducing plutonium to metal, together with numerous service 
facilities. For production complexes with capacities in the range of 8.160 
kilogrammes of weapons-grade plutonium per year, the capital costs 
would be in the range of $22-$87 million, and the annual operating costs 
$5-$10 million, resulting in a cost of $900,000 per kilogramme of plu-
tonium for the small complex and $120,000 per kilogramme for the 
larger complex over the ten-year programme. 
56. Considering the high cost of the gaseous diffusion plant for 
uranium-235, it would seem that a country planning to make only a 
small number of nuclear warheads per year would go to the plutonium 
type. This is particularly so if it has an established activity in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, since pl utonium is produced as a by-product in 
1110St nuclear reactors. 
D~:S IGNING, MANU~'ACTURING AND TESTING 
57. The amount of published information relating to warhead as· 
sembly and test ing is severely limited by military secrecy. 
58. According to a Swedish study made for the purpose of this 
report the capital investments in a factory for assembling ten warheads 
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per year would be about $8 million and allnual operating costs about 
$1 million. 
59. According to the same Swedish study the total costs of testing 
one twenty-kiloton device underground would amount to $12 million, and 
the costs of testing four such devices would amount to $15 million. 
COSTS }o'OR VARIOUS WARUEADS PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES 
Pili/onium warheads production programme 
60. Based on the estimated cost figures given for plutonium pro-
duction and warhead design, manufacturing and testing, the total esti-
mated costs of a small programme (one twenty-kiloton warhead per year 
over ten years) and a moderate programme (ten twenty-kiloton war-
heads per year over ten years) are shown below in table 1. The small 
programme would cost $11 million per year, i.e., $11 million per war-
head, whereas the moderate programme would cost $19 million per year, 
resulting in a warhead lInit price of $1.9 million. If the Sl11al1 programme 
could be combined with plutonium production in a large po ..... er reactor, 
the annual costs might be reduced to $6 million and consequently the 
warhead unit costs to $6 million. 
TABU; I. ESTIMATED COSTS FOIt VARIOUS PLUTQSlUM-BASF.D WARIIEAD 
rRODUCTIOS PROGRAMMES 
(In SUS millions) 
S ... al/ IW'gTa",,,u 
(t'Xl,.liI",,,,, dnnul 
.... " lu J~"") 
Fissile material 70.0 
Design and manufacture ............... 18.0 
Testing .......... . ................... . 12.0 
Storage, maintenance ................... 4.0 
TOTAl. 104.0 
Annual aV(Tage ...... ............ ..... 11.0 
Cost per warhead...................... 11.0 
M~Jr'''''I!'<'i"a''' ... r 
U"X2fUril,.,,,,, "n""w 








Production programme including thermonuclear warheads 
61. The escalation of the total warheads production costs resulti ng 
from the construction and operation of a diffusion plant for enrich ing 
uranium-235 and the development and testing of thermonuclear weapons 
is well demonstrated by the French example shown in table 2. The 
gaseous diffusion plant was built after 1960. 
Cost oj deli"/.·ery vehicles 
62. Table 3 gives a summary of the reported procurement and 
operat ion costs for a variety of delivery vehicles. ranging from ele-
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T ABLE 2. COSTS Of TOTAl. FKI'.~CII N UCI.EAR WARH EAD!> rROGKAMME 
(hI SUS million.f) 
Fi~ .. I~ 
"'alr""1 Do,o" Q"d 
I'rD</ uC/;ON ", " .. ufQ(I .. . ~ T~J li .. g 
To 1960 ................. 160 '0 '" 1960-1964 ............... 8SO 460 300 
1965-1970 .................... 
GRAND TWA!. 1,040 500 340 






mentary to sophisticated systems. The table indicates that the total 
delivery vehicle costs in most circumstances will be greater than the 
nuclear weapons costs . 
63. T he accuracy with which delivery vehicle costs were predicted 
has been notoriously poor. Heavy overruns of expenditures have been 
the rule rather than the exception and have been concurrent wilh lengthy 
delays in the projected time~tables. Many instances exist of the deploy~ 
ment of ext remely costly but already obsolescent weapons systems, which 
were withdrawn a very short time after their initial deployment. Further~ 
more, while it is not always correct, it can be generally assumed tha t the 
accuracy of cost and time estimates for both the development and pro~ 
duetion of delivery vehicles is a function of prior related experience. 
Over rulls are therefore more likely to be incurred when a count ry 
embarks on its first-generation development. 
64. The time needed to develop a delivery system depends on the 
existing industrial base and related e:.:perience and would, ill most cases. 
take at least ten years for reasonably industrialized nations. Costs can be 
spread over time, but peaks occur at certain point s. Obsolescence and 
countermeasures costs are related to the time factor. 
65. Monetary costs do not, by themselves, give a realistic picture 
of the necessary effort ill terms of over-an resources. A sizab!e techno-
logical base is needed to create and maintain a force of delivery vehicles. 
66. Induded here are the necessary skilled workers, engineers, 
scientists and managers, fabrica ting facilities, experimental facilities, test 
ranges, etc. Even if major components can be purchased abroad, the 
delivery system must be integrated into a workable whole, and this 
process requires the skills of a number of qualified persons, which may 
even e:.:ceed the number needed for warhead production. 
PROCURE:MEr;'T COSTS SU MMAR\' 
M odest /wclear capacity 
67. It will be assumed that a modest but signific.1nt nuclear anna-
ment would be represented by a force of from thirty to fifty jet bomber 
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TABU; J. SU~IMAItV OF OD..III£ltV H':liICI.& PROCU RUI£l'o"T A:;O OPEilATIONS COSTS 
(Costs ill $US lIIillio l1s) 
P.""Mrrmr" , 
S:1J'~'" COUfIM:1 Sy,"m dornt""" cuu 
Aircraft. elementary . ........... 30-50 bombers (Cmbcrra. B-57) 180 
{
w missi lcs in 50ft emlliacemem. 1.OOO-kll1 range ...... .. .......... . 
~Iissile. elementary.. . .... 50 missiles in soft emlllaeemel1t: 3 .. 000-km range .................. . 
IJ US Atla ~ squ<ldrons (140 missiles) ................... .. ...... . 
410-540 -4,900 
A' f cd' II f50-60 French :\lirage IV bombers ................................ . 




50 :\Iinutem.<ln I. in hard emplacements. IO.()(X}-km range .......... . 
Missile, medium-level .......... 2S Fr~nd.l SSRS in liard cmJ1la~~len ts. 4.000-km range .......... . 




Aircraft, sophisticatcd ........... 210 US FB- III "ith SRA:\I air-to-surface missiles ........... ... . 2.200 
{
J French missile-launching nuclear submarines, each with 16 missiles 
:\l i55ile. sophisticated ........ of 3,000-km range ........................................ .... . 
41 US Polaris launching submarine~. each with 16 miniles ........ . 
1.000 
13.000 









Not aV;li lable 
Not avai lable 
J.W ( total to 1971) 
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Not available 
aircraft (table 3), together with fifty medium-range missiles of the 
3,OOO-kilometre range in soft emplacements and 100 plutonium warheads. 
The sum of the costs estimated above fo r such a system acquired and 
deployed over ten years would be at least $1,700 million, averaging 
$170 million per year. 
Small, /ligh-qlwlily IIue/ear force 
68. A Polish study has been made for the purpose of this report to 
estimate the costs of a smail, high-quality nuclear force. A hypothetical 
programme comprising two stages each of five years' duration has been 
envisaged. By the end of the first stage (1968- 1972) a nuclear fo rce of 
from ten to fiftccn bombers and from fifteen to twenty nuclear weapons 
would be established, ami during the second stage ( 1973- 1977) the force 
would be extended to include from twenty to thirty thermonuclear 
weapons, 100 intenneJ iate range missiles ;uul two mi ssile-launching 
nuclear submari nes. The total costs oi such a programme based on 
domestic industry and resources would alllount to $5,600 million, cor-
responding to an average annual cost of $560 million for ten years. This 
hypothetical programme could be considered as a scaled-down version 
of the f rench programme. The cost estimate is considerably lower than 
tlte expenditures in France and the United Kingdom. Both are in the 
course of establishing high-quality nuclear forces of moderate size. 
French costs fo r thei r military nuclear programme to 1%9 have been 
estimated at $8,400 million, and the United K ingdom costs to 1%9 are a 
similar amount. Annual outlays of $50 million were representative of 
the early French programme, but outlays later rose to as llIuch as 
$I,<XX) million in a single year. 
69. The actual annual costs of the nuclear forces in some countries 
are shown ill table 4. The costs are also given relative to the allnual 
defcnce budgets and the gross national product (GNP). 
TAIII.I: 4 . A CTU AL COSTS Of N UC U :AI< ml<CES 
T,,/OI 
Prrio d of cosll 
Co~nlr)' li",~ (, n I US n"l/i~"J) 
France ............ ]960-1964 2.400 
1965-1970 5,ZOO 
United King, lom ...... ]962-1963 "" 1965-1966 350 
1966-1967 JOO 
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70. Compari son of the figures given in table 4 should !)e made 
with caution, partly because they refer to countries at different stages of 
nudtar weapons development, and JXlrlly beeause the size of the respec-
tive nuclear forces is not known. 
Eco~oM Ie 1M pr.ICATIONS 
71. \Vhat has been defined as a modest nuclear armament requi res 
not only a len-year programme costing the equivalent of $US 170 million 
per year but resources of special kinds and quality. The basic ingredients 
would !)e raw materials, a corps of skilled engineers and expert scientists 
and a modern industrial base. A study of the number of scientific and 
technical personnel required by a nation to build installations in which 
nuclear warheads could !)e produced on a continuous basis has estimated 
that approximately 1,300 engineers and 500 scientists would be needed. 
Sophisticated delivery systems are equally demanding of high-quality 
materials and skills. For production of the intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles, estimates suggest that manpower requirements for technical and 
skilled personnel would rise higher than those for nuclear weapons. To 
produce over ten yea rs and deploy fifty such mi ssi les, it is estimated that 
a pcak labour fo rce of 19,000 men directly applied would be needed, over 
5,000 of them scientists and engineers with access to high-speed elec-
tronic computers. Skilled personnel would include physicists, aerody-
namic, mechanical, and other engineers and large numbers of produc-
tion workers, including mach ine operators and welders. The suggested 
fleet of fifty bombers would require a minimum of from I to 2 million 
man-hours of skilled and unskilled labour just to assemble. The design 
and development st.:'ge would absorb an additional 2 million or more 
engineering man-hours, which would involve highly skilled efforts in 
ae rodYllamics, stress analysis, design work and flight testing. 
72. To compare the hypothetical nuclear armament costs with other 
major national expenditures, reference has been made to statistical infor-
mation available to the United Nations and published in several editions 
of the Statistical Y rarbook. At this time most of such information is 
available for the year 1964. Expenditures are always expressed in units 
of the national currency. The largest uncenainties in making comparisons 
arise when a variety of e..'xchange rates are quoted for the currency under 
different ci rcumstances and when currencies become unstable. Further 
differences arise because nations operate under different economic sys-
tems and beeause accounts arc kept on differing bases. Because of all 
these differences it is possible to make only rough comparisons, such as 
illustrated in figure VIII. 
73. Fi fty countries which, on the basis of populat ion and total 
expenditures, were seen to be the largest, were selected. Expenditures 
for 1964 on defence, education and health are reported in the United 
Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1965 (United Nations publicat ion, Sales 
No.: 66.XV II.I ), tables 192 and 185, for most but not all of the fifty. 
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Kumbcr of c{)untries reporting higher Cl<penditures for 1964 (or 19(3). 
The numbers at the bottum of the graph representing eoulltries relate to 
tablc II . a n nex IV, page 73. 
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The graph in figure VIII shows these reported expenditures and the 
number of countries with that or a higher expenditure for each of the 
three fields, defence, education and health. 
74. H orizontal lines are drawn corresponding to the two illustra-
tive expenditures of $170 million (US equivalent) per year for a modest 
nuclear force, and of $560 million per year for a small high-quality force. 
The graph shows that these levels would represent a very large compo-
nent of the total defence expenditure for all except about the eleven 
largest countries, that is, seven countries in addition to the existing 
nuclear weapons Powers included in the graph. About twenty countries 
have higher total defence expenditures than that for the mode~t nuclear 
armament of $170 million per year. 
75. It thus appears that there are only abolll seven countries in the 
world, other than the five nuclear weapons Powers, that could contem-
plate an added expenditure of Sl70 million a year to develop a modesl 
nuclear armament without reallocating a major part of their tC!:hnical 
resources from constructive activities. For the small nuclear capabil ity 
suggested, costing $560 million a year, only the seven appear capable 
of finding the necessary resources. 
76. What may be derived correctly from the graph is an apprecia-
tion of the rclative magnitude of the expenditure on a nuclear force 
compared with other government expenditures on defence, education and 
health. Any further deductions from the graph should be made with 
caution, for it must be remembered that accounts arc not kept in the 
same way and rates of currency exchange \'ary. !I'foreover, what are 
reported are central and regional government expenditurcs, and in many 
countries education and health are to a considerable extent financed 
otherwise. 
I MPLICATlONS OF EXPECTE]) GROWTH OF PLUTONIUM RESOURCES 
77. There are two observations that we can make. First, that the 
cost of development of simple nuclear warheads is progressively decreas-
ing as the technology involved is increasi ngly becoming puulic knowledge, 
and a new country can avoid the unprofitable directions which the coun-
tries that pioneered had to discover through costly experience. Second, 
that the large-scale development of nuclear pOlller projects, resulting 
from a break-through in capital as well as operating costs, compa red to 
conventional power stations, will make available a very large capacity 
of potential producers of weapons-grade plutonium. It is estimated that 
by 1980 there would be in the world more than 3 X 1()6 megawatts of 
nuclear power production. This would involve the production of plu-
tonium sufficient for thousands of bombs each year. This illustrates the 
enormity of the problem that the world faces, a problem coupled with 
the peaceful application of atomic cnergy. 
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Ill. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION 
AND FURTH ll lt DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 
I NTRODUCTION 
78. In concluding this report, it is necessary to discuss the impli-
cations to security of the acquisition and further development of nuclear 
weapons. The task is not an easy one. This particular issue, whether 
viewed in a national or an international context, constitutes one of the 
major subjects of present-day political and strategic dehate. It is one 
which is perhaps best approached historica!1y. 
HI STORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
79. As recalled in section I, it was in 1945, at the end of the 
Second \\lorld \Nar, that the world learnt that a nuclear weapon of mass 
destruction had been developed by the United States of America. In the 
reOllization that this development CQuid imply dire consequences fo r 
mankind, the unanimous first resolution of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations was that atomic energy should be placed under inter-
national control and that atomic weapons should be eliminated from 
national arsenals. The attempt failed. A nuclear arms race then began. 
In 1949, the Un ion of Soviet Socialist Republics revealed that it, too, pos-
sessed nuclear weapons. The race acquired new dimensions when both 
Powers developed the II -bomb with an explosive power of megatons and 
when it was also demonstrated that nuclear warheads could be delivered 
accurately not only by airc raft but, over practically limitless ranges, by 
means of intercontinental rockets. From this grew the realization that 
were one side to attack with nuclear weapons, the other could instantly 
retaliate in kind, whether or not there were any differences in the num-
bers of bombs they possessed. So it was that the concept of strategic 
nuclear deterrence evolved. The reality of thi s concept is indicated by 
the fact that whatever the political conflicts between the two super 
Powers over the past fifteen years, Ihey have not engaged in any direct 
military conflict. Fear of the disastrous consequences of the explosion of 
even a few nuclear bombs has so far contrihuted towards inhibiting any 
action which might ha,'e triggered their use. 
80. T he efTort to maintain a state of nuclear deterrence has de-
manded the expenditure of vast resources and, paradoxically, far from 
increasing the sense of security, has at limes engendered a sense of 
insecurity. The opposing sides have taken, and continue to take. major 
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steps to assure themselves that their lIuclear warheads and del ivery 
vehicles are proof against whatever countermeasures might be under-
taken by the other side. These countermeasures are essentially designed 
to increase the chances of a nuclear armoury surviving a pre-emptive 
nuclear assault by the other side and of nudear weapon,; being able to 
penetrate whatever defences the other might deploy. The reciprocal 
technological development and sophistication of nuclear warheads and 
their associated weapons systems which thus results constitut e a spiral-
ling nuclear arms race. Short of mutllal agreement, it is a race which has 
no end, and one which leads 1I0t to a uniform state of security but, as has 
been said, to phases of major insecurity which alternate wilh periods in 
which relative security seems assured. The pace of Ihis race cannot be 
expected to slow down until concrete steps are taken which lead 10 dis-
armament and which promOle the security of all nations. 
81. The United Kingdom, which had been associated with the 
United States during the S('(ond World War in the early development 
of nuclear weapons, subsequently developed, on its own, a smaller nuclear 
armou ry, and, at the start, dclivery systems as well. Canada, which had 
cooOperated with the United Kingdom during the war in the development 
of nuclear teclmology, decided not to embark on the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, France, some of whose scientists 
had also taken part with the United Kingdom and Canada in the war-
time collaborative elTort in nuclear technology, began the development 
of its own nuclear weapons and delivery vchicles in the 1950s. The 
People's Republic of Chilla has recently become Ihe fifth State 10 follow 
the sallie course. The exact nUllIber of nuclear warheads which may now 
exist in the world is not known, but it is quite certain that the anns 
race between the Un ited States and the Union of Soviet Social ist Repub-
lics alone has resulted in Ihe production of weapons whose cumulative 
destructive power is more than sufficient to eliminate all mankind. 
TU E CUlun~NT PROSPECT 
82. So far as international security is concerned, it is highly 
probable that any further increase in the number of nuclear weapons 
States or any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals would lead 
to greater tension and greater instability in the world at large. Both 
these aspects of the nuclear arlllS race are significant to world peace. 
The mounting concern about the spread and development of nuclear 
weapons is a clear manifestation of the fear which now be,;ets the world. 
Additional nuclear Powers accentuating regional tensions could only add 
to the complexity of the problem of assuring peace. Furthermore, it is 
impossible to deny the propo~ilio ll that the danger of nuclear war break-
ing out through accident or miscalculation becomes greater, the larger 
the number of countries which deploy such weapons and the larger the 
stockpiles and the more diversified the weapons they hold. If a nuclear 
conflict were to erupt, however it started, not a single State could feel 
itself secure. Even if a State were not subjected to direct attack, and even 
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if it should not experience any immediate consequences of such an 
attack, it could nevertheless suffer as a result of later radio-active fall-
Ollt. It was largely because the whole world was concerned about the fall-
out from the Iluclear tests of the 19505 and early 1960s that the principal 
international agreement so far concluded to limit the spread of nuclear 
weapons-the partial ban on nuclear tests-was signed in 1963. 
83. Everyone of the five nations known to have nuclear weapons 
describes its motives for developing a nuclear arsenal as purely tactical-
defensive and/or defensive by deterrence. Not one would claim that it 
had developed the weapons because of their value as weapons of offence. 
Bllt the transformations which have occurred over the past twenty years 
in the balance of strategic power in the world, as well as what is implied 
by nuclear war, have produced a vastly different scene from the one 
which existed at the start of the Second World War. It is also plain from 
the history of the past twenty years that the possession of a nuclear 
arsenal docs not, and cannot, signify the same thing to different coun-
tries, either in terms of military power or of pol itical security. Cor-
respondingly, it stands to reason that count ries which have not embarked 
upon the development of nuclear weapons will have refrained from so 
doing \.Iccause of a variety of differing views about the advantages and 
disadvantages of such a step. 
84. The possibility of an increase in the number of count ries acquir-
ing a nuclear arsenal is attributable to different sets of motives. In some 
quarters the fact that the existi ng nuclear weapons Powers have so far' 
failed to reach agreement either about stopping the furt her development or 
of freezing or reducing their own nuclear arsenals is regarded as an argu-
ment for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations. In search-
ing for greater security, some may also helieve that if a state of mutual 
deterrence has been generated between the existing nuclear weapons 
Powers, a corresponding situation could be created between any other 
Powers who already possess the industrial and technological background 
necessary to make bombs and, in future, between countries which do not 
as yet do so. But agai nst such views, it is worth noting that nowhere has 
the development of nuclear weapons made it possible to dispense either 
with troops on the ground or with conventional arms. Any new country 
which embarked on the production of nuclear weapons would soon find 
that it had entered a new anns race without having provided itself with 
the option of abandoning the old. Thus, the burden of an arms race with 
conventional weapons is compounded as soon as a nat ion embarks upon 
the path of acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the insecurity which 
would be brought about by entering the nuclear arms race would make 
it imperative to improve continuously the sophistication of the nuclear 
weapons and their delivery systems, as well as measures for providing an 
early warning of an impending attack. The nuclear arms race demands 
immense technological and other resources and, of itself, creates condi-
tions under which the economic progress of a nation could stagnate. The 
internal insecurity engendered by the diversion of resources can be 
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quite as serious as the external threat to the nation. Again, the acquisi-
tion by any nation of nuclear weapons could also trigger a change in its 
international relations. Non-nuclear neighbours could be tempted to 
acquire nuclear weapons, or they might perhaps undertake immediate 
preventive military action. II aving nuclear Wea\XlIlS on one's own terri-
tory might bring with it the penalty of bc<:ollling a direct target for 
nuclear attack A nuclear capaoility intended to deter or offset another 
on a bilateral basis would be confronted with changing alliances and 
changing balances of power. What had been intended to be a military 
answer to one set of threats might then appear inadequate, subject to 
(Iuick neutralization or elimination in the event of an outbreak of nuclear 
hostilities. Similarily, the existing nuclear Powers might react by coun-
temleasures and/or auempts to strengthen their own position in the 
region and thereby intensify their own arms race. Nuclear weapons na-
tions are also faced with the problems of establ ishing systems of control 
of nuclear weapons within thei r own borders. Not only must there be 
protection against misuse; the tensions which would exist if serious 
civil st rife were to occur in a nat ion that possessed nuclear weapons 
would be greatly intensified. If these problems arc not adequately solved, 
there are added risks to the security of that nation and to the world as a 
whole. It is presumably for reasons such as these that the emergence of 
a fourth and then a fifth nuclear weapons Power has not stimulated 
further proliferation over the past three years. But the situation remains 
far from stable. Even the world-wide concern about proliferation, which 
the major Powers clearly share, has not as yet led to any measures of 
nuclear disarmament. 
85. Clearly any anns race absorbs resources which might other-
wise be used to improve standards of living. The struggle to improve 
Jiving conditions is most effectively pursued when ad\'anced tcclmological 
products are freely exchanged between countries. T his process is hin-
dered by the Illutual fears and suspicions associated with an arms race. 
The peaceful uses of atomic energy, now still on a small scale, are 
expected in the years ahead to berome of major significance to world 
prosperity. Most nations are member States of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, which was established "to accelerate and enlarge the 
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout 
the world". In rCC'Cnt years they have agreed about the need to develop 
a system of safeguards involving inspections to assure that materials 
and facilities acquired to assist a programme of peaceful uses are not 
diverted to any mil itary purpose. In no c.1se does Ihe Agency assist any 
trade leading to nuclear wea]XlIlS. The achievement of the Agency's 
mission is of considerable importance to the peaceful development of 
the whole world. 
T HE ISSUE o~' TACTICAL WEAPO:':S 
86. A second motive additional to the search for "security th rough 
deterrence" which might encourage proliferation is the view that nuclear 
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weapons constitute a form of armament superior to conventional weapons 
in field warfare. Some military commentators assume that armies could 
use such weapons against eaeh other within the zone of contact of a 
battle area. If only one side to a dispute possessed and deployed nuclear 
weapons and was known 10 be ready to use them so as to ach ieve its 
objectives, regardless of any international repercussions, the possibi lity 
exists that it might gain an advantage either from the threat of using 
them- that is to say, the threat itself would deter the military actions of 
its opponent-or from the results of thei r actual usc. It is also just 
credible that if bolh sides were to possess such weapons, whatever their 
actual nature, and one, two or e\'cn a few were to be exploded. the two 
sides would disengage because of the realization, having observed the 
consequences of their use, that the conflict might escalate into an uncon-
trollable conflagration. These thi ngs arc pos.sible. Bul the contra ry is far 
more likely. It is hardly likely thai a non-nuclear-weapons country, living 
in a state of hostility with a neighbour, could start to furnish itself with 
a nuclea r arsenal without either driving its neighbour to do the s..,me or 
to seek protection in some form or other, explicit or implicit, from an 
existing nuclear weapons Power or Powers. Equally, if in the pursuit 
of its political objectives, aile of two sides, both of which possessed and 
deployed nuclear weapons, were to have the will to initiate the use of its 
weapons, it is difficult to see how a nuclear engagement could be stopped 
once it had started. The speed of military reaction and experience of past 
military operations do IlOt encourage any opposite conclusion. From what 
has been said in section I of the report, it is clear that , given that both 
sides to a confli ct deploy nuclear weapons, it is highly debatable whether 
there are any circumstances of land warfare in which such weapons could 
be used as hattlefield weapons or, if they were so used, would confer any 
military advantage to either side in the zone of contact. Whatever signifi-
cance can be attributed to tactical nuclear wea{Xlns is to be found essen-
tially in the concept of deterrence. 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS I N TilE POLI TICAL CONTEXT 
87. The third argument which is sometimes advanced in favour of 
the aC(luisition of nuclear weapons is that doing SO promotes political 
independence, enhances national prestige and thus a country's influence 
on the international scene. A contrary "iew is that the influence of cer-
tain Po\\ ers in international affairs would be the same whether or not 
they possessed nuclear weapons. T he issue of prestige is equally debat-
able. Undoubtedly there may for a short time be some imponderable 
clement of prest ige in the manifestation of the technological prowess 
which is implied by the development of nuclear weapons. )Jut this 
prestige is a mixed blessing and could rapidly generate those deleterious 
reactions on Ihe part of neighbou ring States to which reference has 
heelllllade in a preceding paragraph. 
88. When one asks whether or nOI the acquisition and further 
development of nuclear weapons increases security, one thus ends tip 
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wilh two very simple questions. The first is what, in fact , have nuclear 
weapons contributed SO far to military power? In so far as this question 
can be answered, the reply can only be that while the nuclear weapons 
Powers have never suffered aggression on their own territories, and 
while the state of mutual deterrence which prevails between the two 
super Powers has helped to avert any head-on conflict between them and 
has indeed imposed a new kind of restraint in their political actions with 
respect to each other, it has not made it possible for either to reduce 
its military expenditures in general or to neglect the effectiveness of its 
conventional annoury in particular. Tn a smaller way, the same conclu-
sion applies to both the United Kingdom and France. 
89. At the same time, profound limitations clearly exist in the pos-
sible use of these weapons. T he consequences of their employment either 
in all-out war or in field warfare would be so disastrous to hath sides 
that it is very difficult to conceive of circumstances in which they could 
be used. Where two sides possess such weapons, it is totally unrealistic 
to suppose that one could lise them in a military connict without pro-
voking retaliation by the other. Once retaliation had occurred, it is also 
difficult to suppose that a nuclear conflict would not escalate in intensity. 
T he possibi lity that it might not cannot be excluded; but the chances 
are much greater that it would. The situation might, of course, be totally 
different if only one side to a localized conflict possessed nuclear 
weapons. But here one needs to observe that views about the value of 
nuclear we..pons as actual inst ruments of military power vary just as 
much in States that do not possess nuclear weapons as in those that do. 
For example, over the past twenty years non+nuclear-we..pons cou ntries 
have not been deterred from engaging in battle on or ncar their own 
ground with States possessing nuclear weapons. In these encounters, the 
latter have not found that their possession of nuclear weapons and their 
deployment in the theatre of operations has made the course of conven-
tional war any easier. lndeed, since the end of the Second World \Var, 
no nuclear weapons State has been able to dcrive ally immediate military 
advantage from the possession of nuclear weapons, let alone use them 
to gain an easy victory. 
90. The second question is in what way, if at all, does the pos-
session of nuclear weapons strengthen power; or what quality, if any, 
do such weapons impart to it ? This is a much more difficult question. 
National secu rity and political powcr are tenuous concepts. There arc 
countries which enjoy a high measure of both, regardless of the fact 
that they do not count among the military Powers of the world. Equally, 
while the nuclear Powers have at times been able to exercise immense 
polit ical power and economic innuence in world affairs, there have also 
been moments in recent history where this has not been so, regardless 
of the great nuclear forces of which they dispose. Correspondingly, the 
possession of nuclear forces does not necessarily prevent a decline in 
political influence. Were the acquisition and maintenance of a Iluclear 
arsenal to impose a major economic and technological burden on a 
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country, it is possible that possession of such an arsenal would be asso-
ciated with a reduction, and not with an increase, in both the national 
security and political inOuence of the coullt ry concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
91. Since the sense of insecurity on the part of nations is the 
cause of the arms race, which in turn enhances that very insecurity, and 
in so far as nuclear armaments are the end of a spectrum which begins 
with conventional weapons, the problem of reversing the trend of a 
rapidly worsening world situation calls for a basic reapprai~al of all 
interrelated factors. The solution of the problem of ensuring security 
cannot be found in an increase in the number of Stales possessing 
nuclear WC.1pOilS or, indeed , in the retention of nuclear weapons by the 
Powers currently possessing them. An agreement to prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United ~ations, freely nego-
tiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in 
the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of 
existi ng nuclear arsenals. Security for all countries of the world must be 
sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and 
the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament. 
92. A comprehensive lest ban treaty, prohibiting the underground 
testing of nuclear devices, would also contribute to the objec:tives of non-
proliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race. 
So would effective measures safeguarding the security of nOll-nuclear 
countries. Nuclear-weapon-free zones additional to tho~e of Antarctica 
and Latin America, covering the maximum geographical extent possihle 
and taking into account other measures of arms control and di~arll1amellt, 
would equally be of major assistance. 
93. These mc.1StlreS are mentioned neither to argue the case for 
them nor to set them in any order of priority. What the analysis of the 
wbole problem shows is that anyone of them, or any combinatiou of 
them, cou ld help inhibit the further multiplication of nuclear weapons 
Powers or the further elaboration of existing nuclea r arsenals and so 
help to ensure nat ional and world security. But it mllst be realized that 
these measures of arms limitation, however desirable, cannot of them-
selves eliminate the threat of nuclear conflict. They should be regarded 
not as ends sufficient in themselves but only as measures which could 
lead to the rednction of the level of nuclear armaments and the lessening 
of tension in the world and the eventual elimination of nude.1r anna-
ment s. All countries have a dear interest in the evolution of a world 
which allows of peaceful and stable C(lCxistence. ~on-nudear weapon 
countries. as well as those which po~sess nuclear weapons, need to work in 
concert. creating conditions in which there !>hould be free access to mate-
rials, e(luipmcnt and information for achieving all the peaceful benefits of 
atomic energy, and for promoti ng international security. 
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94. This report gives the bare outline of the disasters which could 
be associated with the use of nuclear weapons. It discusses the nature 
and varicty of the economic burden they impose. And it unhesitatingly 
concludes from the considerations that have been sel out that whatever 
the path to national and international security in the future, it is cer-
tainly not to be fou nd in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear 
weapons. The threat of the immeasurable disaster which could befall 
mankind were nuclear war ever to erupt , whether hy miscalculation or 
by mad intent , is so real that informed people the world over under-
standably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to 
the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to--
the limited b.."ln on testing, the prohibition of nuclear weapons in outer 
space, and the nuclea r-free zone of Latin America. International agree-
ment against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agree-
ments on measures of arms control and disarmament will promote the 
seeurity of all countries. The United Nations has the overridi ng respon-
sibility in thi s field. The more effective it becomes in action, the more 
powerful il s authority, the greater becomes the assurance fo r man's 
fulure. And the longer the world waits, the more nuclea r arsenals grow, 
the greater and more diflicult becomes the eventual task. 
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A ll ttpx I 
GENERAL CIIAIL\CTERlSTICS OF NUCLEAR EXI'LOSIONS 
I. The yield of a nuclear II'eallOn is expressed in terms of the energy released 
II hen it i$ exploded. compared wilh Ihe energy liberated by the explosion of the 
chemical explosive trinitrotoluene (T NT). The biggest bombs ever made from con-
\'entional explosive contained the equivalent of about iO tOIl$ of TNT. A otic-kiloton 
nuclear w~lIOn produce! lhe same amount of energy as 1,000 tons of TNT. Cor-
respondingly, a one-megaton weapon would release energy equi\'a\cnt to 1 million 
tons (or 1,000 kilotons) of TNT. Using polledu\ rockets, any such weapons 
could be delivered, ill [e55 Ihall all IlOur, bct\\ccn any two points 011 earth. Nuclear 
explosions of more than fifty meg<ltons have <l lready occurrtd and even larger 
0lle5 are possible, since there apl~ars to be 110 upper limit to tile) icld of a nuclear 
weapon excepl in tenllS of practicable si~e and weight. 
Is Til t: ATMOSI'HERE 
2. When a nuclear weapon is exploded in the atmosphere, 50 per cent of its 
total energy is releastd as blast and shock, 35 per cent as thermal radi:l\ion and 
15 IJoe r cent as nuclear mdiatiol1 (see figure I X). These l) rO]lOrtions vary accord-
ing to whelher the explosion is carried out ill Ihe atmosphere, or al altitudes 
gre:.ter than 100,000 fee t, or underground. At high altitudes, the prOl)()rtion of 
!'IGUIt£ IX. DISTRIIlUTIOX OF ENERGY IN AS AIR-BURST OF A FISSIOS WEAPON 
AT AS AI.TITUUE 0.' U;SS T Ii AS 100,000 Y.:f:r 
Initial 
nuclear radiation 
(5 per cent) 
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Residual 
nuclear radial ion 
(10 per cenl) 
energy converted into blast would be decreased while the proportion of intense 
thermnl rndintion would be increased; in the underground case, no thermal radia-
tion would escape. A nuclear explosion thus differs charactcristkally from an 
explosion caused by conventional explosivu, not only in that its explosh'e power 
is several orders of magnitude greater than for a conventional explosive of the 
same mass, but also in so far as it resnlts in effects from thermal and IlnclC:lr 
radi:ltion. 
3. The bl:lst effects and associated overpressures from any particular nuclear 
explosion depend on the power of the weapon exploded and the altitude at which 
the explosion oceurs (tables I and 2). The thermal radiation travels through the 
atmosphere :I t the speed of light and to dis t:lnces depending on visibility through 
the atmosphere at the time of the explosion (see fignre X). It can be of sufficient 
intensity from a one-megaton explosion 011 a fairly clear day to cause moderately 
severe burns on exposed skin o\"er a radius of twenty kilometres (table 3). The 
FIGURE X. T OTAL TIIEln!A\. EN.:I\GY D.:UVEREO, AS A fliNCTIO;O;" 0.' DISTANCE FROM 
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heat might be felt as far away as 120 km. Serious fires could be started in 
cities and [orcst~, possibly leading to fire-storms, i.e., gigantic fires in which air 
is sucked into the centre of the burning region to create a flaming fUllnel which 
destroys everything within it. For atmospheric explosions, having an energy 
greater than one megaton, Ihcse distanccs would be C\'en greater. It has been 
estimated thJt 011 a clear day. a ten-megJton bomb cxplo(lL-d at an altitude of fifty 
kilometres wonld scorch the earth's surface over an area "ith a radius of some 
seventy kilometres. The thermal energy received per unit area, at a specified dis-
lance from a nuclear explosion, is usually expressed in calories per square 
centimetre. 
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TABLE 3. RASGES, IN KIl.OMETRES fRO,", GROUSD-ZUO, AT Wlilell .·IRST- ,..NIl 
StCOSD-DEGIll:.£ BURSS WOULD lit. INFLICTtD IIY u:rI.OSIOSS OF VAlliOUS )II,..GSI-
TUDt:! IN THE AT,",OSl'lItR£-
DuluU i~ ..... ;T"'" ~'U:h~'~ ~;rrJ"I_ 
IhgTrr of b'H'" '" 10 .. , 100 .. , J All 10 Alr 
First ·degrce burn 
(reddening of skin) 1.12 3 8.5 22.4 48 
Sccund-dcgrec burn 
(blistering of skin) 08 2,4 6.4 18 38.4 
• In the case of surface explosions, the corresponding distancc~ \\ould be 
approximately ~ l those for an aerial eXlllosion of the s.1me effectivcncss. 
4. Figure XI sho\\s the area olcr which blast and thermal radiation effects 
would occur for typical ten-kilot<;OII, "ne-megaton ami ten-mcg:lton explosions in 
the atmosphere. \\'ithin the circle in which o\'erpre'<'SUfe amounts to 0.35 kg/cm' 
mo~t UOflllal bui«liugs l\"f,uld be compklel) destro~ed. For bilist Ol'efl'reuure of 
0.07 kg/em' \\indoll frames, dOllrs and walls would be only s1iglllly damaged. 
Within the central lone of heal'~- lbuMgc there \\(.uld be great dauger of fires 
and indil'iduals would be expused to effects of nuclea r and therm:11 radiation as 
II ell as blast. 
I SITI AI. "t:Cl.t;.\R MAnlATIOS 
5. The nudear radiation frOIl1 a nudear explosion, occurring in the atmos-
phere, may be further eon<idert.'il as consisting of one third initial radiation, i.e., 
IJroduced within a minutc or so of the explosion, and two thirds residual or 
delalcd nuclear radiation, i.e., emined O\'er a much longer period of time. The 
initial radi:ltion may cause radiati'.n ~ickIJes~ or death in human beings, depending 
011 the dose of radiation rccei\'ed ( table 4). A radiation dose of 100 rads' docs 
not usually hale harmful consequences for an exposed organi~m. A do~ of 200 
r.tds may proouce some blood ch.-mgb while a dose of 1,000 rads \\ill cause ill-
ne-s \\ ithin fou r hours :md death within tln1 or three weeks. Doses of 400 to 500 
Tads will cause radialion sickm.:,s an,] a 50 pcr cent expectation of death. These 
dose estimates apply to :I{ule gannna" ralliation; the same effects would be pro-
ducl'(l by lower doses of neILLrons (sec also t.1b!e 5). 
6. The initial nuclear ra(liati"IJ from all explosion in the almosphere abo 
tral'els a [oog way in ai r , although Ihe intensity f;llls off fairly rapidly with in-
creasing distance from tin.' eX lllo~ion. Unlike thermal radiation, nuclear radiation 
passes easily through most ph) <iral b.1rrieT$. Ilca\'y lalers o[ 1II:1leri:ll$ are 
IJcWed to reduce the inten"ily oi nuclear radiation to harmlcss proportions: e.g., 
al a di~tance of 1.5 kilomelru from a OIIe-megaton weapon, burst in the almos-
Ilhere, an individual would need the I'rotectioo of about 30 cm of steel or 130 em 
of concrete to be relal; \'ely safe (rom the effects of initial nuclear radiatioo. 011 
Ihe olher hand, allY opaque objl.t such as buildings or protectil'e clothing inter-
posed between the nuclear eXI'I"siun :md exposed skin would pro\'ide protection 
against thermal radiation. T his "uuld remain true elell ir the building llere sub-
sequently destroyed by bla ~t, since the main thermal radiation 1I'0uid have passed 
before the arrival of the blast \\:\I'e . 
• Rad: A unit of absorbed do~e of radiation; it represents the absorption of 
100 erg~ of nuclear (or ionizing) radiation per gramme of the absorbing m;lter ial 
or tissue. An erg is a unit of work. It is the work done when a unit rorce of one 
dyne moves a body throllgh one centimetre in Ihe directiOll of action flf the force. 
"Gamma rOIl S (or radi:ttioIJs) are electromagnetic radia tions of high energy 
oTigmaling in atomic nudei and accomlJallying marly nudear reactions for exam-
ple, fission and radio-activity. ' 
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TABLE 4" SU'"t:l4 ... .... Of" CL INICAL E"'"ECTS Of" ACUTE IOS I ZING IlAD IATlON DOSES 
100 to 1,000 rads"- thcr~peutic r~nr;e (i.e., ran~ in O,"cr 1,000 rads-
whi<::b therapy may be effective) lethal range 
o to 100 ladS-
100 to 200 rods 200 10 600 rads 600 to 1,000 .ads 1,000 to 5,000 rads Over 5,000 rada 
s ubclinical CUnical Therapy T he.apy T herapy palliati,"e 
Range ,ange surveillance eHecti,'O promising 
Incidence d vomilin, N_ 
100 ,ads: 5 per cent 3OOrads:100 percent 100 pet cenl 100 p"r cenl 
200 rads; 50 per cent 
[)elay t ime - 3 hOtUI 2 hollft, 1 hour 30 !ninutes 
Leadin& Df&an N~, ll aematopoietic Unue 
Gas trointestinal Centra l lll'n'llu\! 
hact sys le m 
t 
Sto~re leukopenia; pIIrp .. a; Diarrhoea; fe'"!'r; Conv\llsions; 
Characteristic si&1IS None lIode,ate lellkopenia hDCIIIOrrha&e; infection; disturbance of IrelllOl; ataxia; 
epilaliOIl at>or,.e 300 ,~ds electrolyte balance lethargy 
Critical period - -post'exposure 4106 ,,"eeks 5 to 14 days 1 1o 48 hOUJI 
ReallsurBnce; Blood Iransfu~lon; Consider bone ~l3intenance of 
Therapy Reusurance haemalololtic antibiotics mallO"'" IrDns- electrolyle S.,.jative\! 
sur\"Ciliance plantation balallCe 
Pfotr\oois Ellec\!"n! Ellee!!en! Good Guarded Jlope!..!\! 
Con'"alescent period None Se\'OTa I weeks I !Q 12 menths Loo, 
Incidence d death N~. N~ o to 80 perl~:nt 80 tQ 100 ~)~nt 90 to 100 per cent 
( .. lIriable (variable 
Death occur\! within - - 2 months 2 weeks 2 days 
CaU$(! al death - - Uaemonbate; infeclioa Circulatory Respilatory f;ilure; collapse brain oedema 
FU':UIIE XI. ES\'lIlONloIENT"'L V"'II I"'TIONS DUE TO BLAST "ND TII£IUIAL R"DI"'TIOS 






* lOki 1 2 , , 
km 50 4. 3. 20 ,. • ,. 20 30 4. 5. km 
10 kt 1 MI 10 Mt 
No Effects Range Area Range Area Range Area 
(km) (km 2) (km) (km2) (km) (km2) 
1 Second degree burns . . , 2.4 lS.1 18 1018 38.4 4382 
2 Overpressure 0,07 kG/ cm2 1.6 8.0 8.8 243 19.2 1158 
3 Overpressure 0.35 kG/cm2 1.2 4.5 45 63.6 14.7 680 
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TABLE 5. RANGES, IN KILOMETJ!.ES FROM CROllI'll-ZERO, WITlliN W lIlC lJ AN Al·MOS-
I'HEJ!.l e ExrLOSJON" WIU. PRODUCE GI\'EN DOSES or INITIA L N"llCLEAR ItALlIATIOS" 
'" 10 AI 100 AI 1 .III 10 MI 
Radiation dose 
100 rads 1.1 2 1.6 2.1 2.9 3.8 
500 rads .. ...... 0.96 I.3 1.8 2.4 3.4 
1.000 rads 0.8 1.12 1.6 2.24 3.2 
• Distances for cc; r responding radiation doses would be reouced in Ihe case of 
surface explosions. 
RF.SID UAL NCCLEAII. IIADIATIOX (~·AI.I.-oU T ) 
7. Residual or dclayed radiation' arises almost entirely from the radio-
actidty of the debris left by the explosion. The proportion of th is radbt ion may 
\'ary according to the Iype of nuclear l\eapon exploded. lIIetoorologic:tl and gral·i-
tational forces cause the bomb debris to be spread widely through the allllosphere 
o\'er the countryside. The heavier particles fall close to the scene of the explo-
sion, descending like a mild s;uul-storll1. while the lighter particles are carr ied 
downwind. Both the heavy and light particles contain fuseu fission products and 
arc highly radio-actil·e ; they constitU!i: "fall-out'" containing some fl~sion products 
which rcmain dangerously radio-active for a relatively short period of time and 
some which will remain dangerously radio-active for many years. The fo rmer 
category contributes most of the extcrnal ra(lialion after the initial burst; it also 
contributes to internal r<ldiatiOIl Ihrough iodine-131 which when absorbed in the 
body is concent r:lted in the thyroid. In the second (long-livetl.) category, st ron-
tium-90 and eaesium- 137 are the most important fission products leading to radio-
'Iclive contamination of human diets. 
8. Relatil·ely local fall-ollt llIay contaminate very extensil·C areas, depending 
011 the size of the explosion. the height at \Ihich the explosion takes place. the 
wind pat tern in the area at the time oj the explosion and rain-out through the 
atmosphere (figure XII). Such an arC""d may be of the ord;,r of some fifty square 
kilometres for a twenty-kiloton explosion, near the surface of the earth. In this 
case the debris would be I,l rgcly confined to the lower atmosphere and .. oout half 
of it would be r('lI1ol"ed, chiefly by rainfall, in a period of about three or four 
weeks, .. \though some of the particles might circle the ear th one or more times 
before being deposited. For an explosion of say tell megatons at the surface of 
the e .. rth, intense local fall-out might extend as far as 500-600 km from the 
point of the explosion. If such .. n explosion occurred well abol'e the surface of 
the earth, a considerable fraction of the debris would be car ried into the strato-
sphere and. in Ihese circumstances, stolllC debris would reqllire months or evcl1 
years to return to earth. By that time a Ilrge proportion of the radio-active atoms 
produced by the explosioll would ha\\~ decayed. 
9. In one particular inddent, when a fifteen-megaton device was detonated 
in a nuclear test on a coral island, t he resulting fall-out seriously cOI1lOlll1 inated an 
elongated a rea extending approximately 530 km downwind and varying in width 
up to nearly 100 km. In addition, there was a severely contamiuatcd region up-
wind extending some thir ty ki lometres from lhe point of detonation. A total area 
of some 18,000 sq. km. \\as contaminated to such an extent thOit survival would 
• Some delayed radia tion may arise from radio-activi ty produced in materials 
iu soil or structures as a result of nuelear reacliollS, following the capture o f 
ncutrons in such materials. after a nuclear eXI)losion. This is known as inducec.l 
XIII shows the estimated exposures that would have been received by individuals, 
radio-acti"ity. 
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FIGURE XII. TOTAL-EXPOSURE CONTOl1l1S FRO~I EARI.V t'All -OUT AT I , 6 AND 18 
HOURS ArrER SURFACE-BURST WITll I -MEG-'ro:.: fi SS ION Ylt:to (24 I.:~I/IIR 
ErFECfIVF. WI:':D SPUD). EXl'OSlaF.S I:': IIOES TGE:':S ( R) . O:':E ROESTGE:': OF 
C.UI )IA RADIATION CORRESPOSlIS TO TilE ABSORt'TIOS Of ADOUT R7 ERGS I'£R 
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have dcpendl'tl on evacuation of the area or taking protective measures. Figure 
r~maining unprotected in the open, at \';lriOUS locations ninety-six hours {ollowing 
the explosion. Since an exposure of 700 rads spread O\'~r a pt: riod of ninety·six 
hours would probably prove fatal in a majority of cases, it follows that, fo r this 
particular explosion, there was sufliciellt radio-activity in a downwind belt of 
270 km X 56 kill to ha\'e threatened the lives of nearly all persons who remained 
in the area unprotected for at least ninety.six hours, At gr~ter dist.1nces there 
would h:l\'e been many cases of sickness resulting in temporary incapacity" 
10. Ruidual radiation, liberated by the decay of nuclear debris. may cause 
an incr~se of several hundred timt$ the radiation normall}' present as b:lckground 
radi;ltion in ;In), area and may seriously inhibit or even prcvent local rescue and 
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relief operations. Apart from the dirtt t huard of such addi tional radiation to 
human Il<!ings, there is an indirect huard from heavy fall-out contamination of 
soil, plant life and water SUllll lies, through subsequent ingestion of contaminated 
food supplies. In the incident reported in the previous paragraph, the people 
exposed :It l~ongelap, Ilarticularly children, also received high doses of radiation 
to the thyroid due to internal radiation from ingested radio-iodine. \Vater sup-
plies may well Il<! rendered temporarily unusable. These diret: t and indirect huards 
add to the immediate I,hy~ical disaster of a nuclear explosion by produeing radia-
tion sickness and death fo r sections of the population who, being on the periphery 
of the immediate damage area, would otherwise have appeared to survive the 
explosion. In fact the human casualt ies may be caused at distances where the 
immediate physical effects of the explosion are totally absent. 
II. It can be calculated that a hypothetical nuclear attack of 10,000 megatons 
in ground·bursts could, in the course of sixty days, dest roy 80 pu cent of the 
IlOpulation of the United States, if unprotected, while an attack of 2'0,000 mega-
tons could cover the entire country with radio-active fa ll-out, killing 95 per cent 
of the unprotccted population. Similarly ill the Soviet Union, which has an area 
g reater th:ln tha t of the United States, a 10,000 megaton blow could wipe out 
75 per cent of the population. "hereas a 20,000 mcgaton attack could increase the 
population losset to around 90 per cent. 
12. Fall-out from nud(.';lr explosions still pro"ides a ma jor contribut ion to 
the radio-aeti\e contamination of our natnral environml'.nt. The ra te at which it 
is deposited Oller the world depends on a number of fac tors, including the total 
amount of radio-active material rcmailliug in the stratosphere_ Any injection of 
nuclear debris into the stratosphere, as a re~u1t of high-yield nucle."l r explosions, 
is fo llowed after a period of time by a rise in fall-out rates roughly proportional 
to the amount injected. In the ab~ence of further atmosflheric nuclca.r tes ts, deple-
tion of the 5trato~phcre progressively take~ place and the rate of fall-out decreases 
accordingly. The global ra lK of deposition ha\'c been well (Ioc:nmented in a series 
of publications by the Uni ted Nations Scientifi<; Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation. T hese relate to studies from the beginning of nuclear tests and 
continue through the years of public concern about long-term radiat ion hazards. 
beginning with thc intenshe nuclcar weapon testing in the atmosphere in the 
19505. and including the intcn<ive atmowher ie testing in 1961/1962, immediately 
before the nuclear tes t b~n tre:l ty of 1963. Although that trea ty Stlugh! to Ilrohihit 
any further lIuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere, some further testing in the 
atmosphere has been enrried out by two countries which did not sign the test ban 
treaty. However, the Unitcd Nations Scientific Committee reported in 1966 tha t 
the atmo~pher ic tests in central Asia up to that year contributed negligibly to the 
risk of rallbtion. as compared with that alrearl)' existing from the pre" ious injec-
tion of n\lclC2r debris into the stratosphere. 
U!'iOEItWATEk E)( I'I.OSlOl'o'S 
13. In explosion under watCT, as ill the case of a nuclear explo<inn in the 
atmos])hcTe, a fI re-bail is :lgain formed and the rapid expansion of hot gases 
initiate~ a sllock WinoI.'. But the fire-ball is much smaller, and remain~ visible only 
until the bubble of con~titl1ent hot high·pre~sure gaseo :IIl!1 ~team reaches the 
surf:lce of the water. The shock \\'a\"c C:lUSCS a spray dome to rise over the point 
of burst. \\i lh time of rise and height of dome dC[lCnding on the energy )ield of 
the cX]llo~ion ami the ,jl,~th of detonation. Ottails of underwater nuc1e~r cxplo-
sions carried out in the Pacific in 1946 aud 1958 are given in annex 111, refer-
ence I. 
14. Thermal radi:ltion emitted from the fi re-ball while under waler would Il<' 
:lbsorbcd by the surrounding water. 50_ too, i, the ini tial nuclear radiation al-
though, as soo!! as the fi re-ba ll reaches the surface, gamma radiation from fission 
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products in the 113ter column aud the subsequent radio--active cloud acts as initial 
nuclear radiation. The waler fall-oul from the cloud, and the "base surge" (spray 
rising from water surface), wO\1ld be responsible for delayed or residual nuclear 
radiation. Thus, since in this ease the "initial"' nuclear radiation merges continu-
ously Ilith that prod\lcN o,'er a pc:riod of time, it is less meaniugful to make the 
5.1me kind of distinction between initial and residual radiation as applies in the 
case of an explosion in the atmosphere. 
15. After an underwater nuclear explosion, most of the radio-activity remain-
ing in the water and on the bollom would be found initially in the vicinity of the 
explosion. Table 6 shows the rate of spread of radio-active matcri.11 and the 
decrease in dose rate, follol\ing the shallow underwater uplosion in the Pacific 
in 19-u). For detonations in dl'Cp water some activity may be left on the surface 
to diffuse rapidly downward and outward, thus reducing the radio-activity level 
to safe limits for IlCrSOlmel. 
16. Radio-activity falling back from the high airborne cloud on to the sea 
extends downward much farther than "base surge" contaminatioll or that trans-
ported by the water. The fall-out debris quickly mixes with the water and, since 
the water absorbs (or attenuates) the radi;ltion to a considerable u:tent, the 
radio--acti,'e hazard is much less than would result from the same fall-out over 
land. The radio-active material is gradually transpor ted to other locations by pre-
vailing currents and, if these are known, the Ila th of the contamillated water can 
be predicted. 
TABLE 6. D[~[£NS[O~5 AND DOS":' R.\T£ IN OOSTAlIINATt.D WATD .... .-rEI. TnE 20 KT 
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GENETIC EFFECTS OF NUCLEAII RADIATION 
1. It has been established by experiment thl! ionizing radiation c.an induce 
changes in hereditary nt.1terial in plants, in animals and in humau beings. Such 
changes fall into two broad categories: first, geue mutations, eOllsisting of 
I:hangcs in single genes, which are the elementary units of information that form 
the genetic "message" transmitted by each ])arent to offspring through the germ 
cells; 5«ondly, gross chromosome anomalies which are due to loss, duplication or 
re~arrangement of major or minor parts of the chromosomes in which the genes 
are I:ootained and thus involve whole bllX.ks of the elemcT1lary wlits that make 
up the genetic "message". It must be noted that simila r gelletic changes t.1n also 
IX.cur spolltancously in humln and other species. 
2. Geneticists agree that the overwhelming majority of Ilt:ldy occurring 
genetic chauges. II helher spontaneous or induced by radiation or any other agent, 
3re detrimcntal. Individuals I:arr)ing the affected genes or chromosomes It. we a 
reduced chance of transmitting their genetic "message" bcc.1use of reduced fertility 
or reduced likelihood of survival. Eventually these gelletic 1:h.1nges will thus be 
eliminated from the population. Some of them may result in barely noticeable 
social consequences as when an immature germ I:ell is lost or a fertilized egg fails 
to implant. But other changes may causc serious hardship for ooth an individual 
:\1ld society i£ tht:)' a ffect the normal developmental p:lItcrns in noticeable "":1)'5 
and lead to such damage as mental deficiency or a major physical disability. 
3. Since most of the sllOnt.1neous mutations in mau are bt:licl'ed to be elimi-
nated during the development of either the germ cells or the embryo, they cannot 
readily be detected; but it has been possible to obsene the frequencies of a num-
ber of dominant hereditary traits which m:llIifcst themselves in the offspring of 
thc individuals who transmit the al tered genes, and to estimate the relevant muta-
tion ralcs. The f requencies of certain spont.1neously occurring chromosome anOIll-
aliu associa ted with mental and physic:ll tldeets are also known. ~Iost of these 
defects are the results of challges which took place in the germ cells of the 
parents of the affected indh'iduals. 
4. No dirtl't informatiun is currently available on the rate of radiation-induc-
tion of gene mutations in man. Estimates of the genctic risks arising from 
ionizing radiation, however, can be base.1 on resul ts of experiments Oil animals, 
particularly mice or, in the case of chromOllOme anomalies. on studies Idth tissue 
cultures of human skin and blood exposed to radiation. EXllCrimcnts on mice con-
fi rm results of experiments with lower organi~ms in shOll ing that the )icld of 
gene mutations is directly proportional to the radiation dose. T hey also show that 
the yield per unit dose is lowcr when the dOM! is delil'ered over a long period of 
time than whcll delivered instantly. While these experimenb have made it possible 
to describe the rnutatiollai effects of irradiat ion, they do not provide adequate evi-
dence that could be applied to man, regarding the manner or ratc IIith which 
indoced gene mutations would be eliminated from the populatioll, or thc propor-
tion of mutations th.1 t IIould have serious eonscqut'111:~. It is not, therefore, IIOS-
sible to assess how many, say, crippled or mentally defective individuals would 
appear in any generation descended frOIll irradiated individu3ls, ami the total 
number summed o\'er all generations is also highly uncertain. The limitatiolls of 
the t! xperimenU, 3nd the assumptions made, lead to widely ranging Iluantitative 
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cstim:ltes of the frequency of possible defects in offspring. Except for Ihe pnr-
pose of ruling out some of Ihe most extreme possibilities, these estim:ltes arc of 
limited value and are, thereforc, not included here. 
5. Unlike gene mutations, radi:ltion-induced chromosome anomal ies have becn 
directly observed in body tissues of irradiated hum;\n beings. They have also 
bee.n studied in a wide number of plant and animal species. including mice and 
monkeys where they have been directly observed in immalme germ cells. Again. 
as for genc mutat ions, the yield of cJlromosome anomalks depends on the radia-
tion dose but the relationship between dosc ;Uld frequenc)' of anomalies is more 
complicated than for gene mtllatiolls and, where low doses ;'Ire involved, is less 
well known. On the basis of somewhat arbitrary assumptions. it is possible to 
obtain quanti talive estimatcs of tIle rate of induction by radiation of a few types 
of chromosome anomalies known to be :lssociated with certain severe physical 
and mental defects in man, but how much weight could be attached to such esti-
mates is uncertain. More important, nothing is known about the likely ratts of 
induction of other, more commOI!, chromosome anomalies which, in IlOIl-irradiatcd 
populations, arc present in, :lnd seriously affect, about I per cent of a11 live-born 
chil~reo. and are also responsible for about 4 per cent of all spontaneous mis-
carnages. 
6. Most of the known defects :lssodatccl Ilith chromosome anomalies a re so 
severe as to preclude reproduction of the individuals IIho are affected. A large 
fraction of the induced chromosome anomalies can, therefore, be expected to in-
volve at most the immediate, first-generation offspring of the individuals io which 
they have arisen. 
7. In general, the long-term genetic effects of nuelear radiation in living 
otg:lnisms are cumulative. \Vhile no visible injury would accompany the induction 
of genetic changes in the exposed individual~. wldesirable consequences would 
arise in Sllcceeding generations until the changes wcre eliminated from the IIOPU-
ration by thei r OWl! detriment. Study of the effect of massil'e radiation. 011 a spe-
cific pollUlation, requires a thorough allal)'5is of Ihc relationship between the doses 
delivered and the frequencies of the changes produced. It also d<:ll1ands a global 
evaluation of the social as well as the biological consequences of \.hese effects. 
L."Ick of information 011 radio-genetics, together Idth uncertainty about the :lmount 
of radiation to which a population would be exposed in any given nuclear war, 
makes calculations about genctic damage very unreliable. But it is rC:tsonably 
certain that a population which had been irr:ldiated at an intensity sunicient to 
kill C\'en a few per cent of its members, would suffer imporl:lnt long-term conse-
quences. 
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A IltIC.f ' I' 
BASIC COSTS OF NUCLEAII WA III IEAIlS 
FISS IONABI.E MATERIALS 
I. T he three materials suitable for the application as a nuclear explosive are 
uranium-235, plutoniulll-239 and uranium·233. They all possess Ihe main properties 
required, i.e., long half-life, a sufficient high probabi lity for fission and low prob-
abili ty for spontaneous fission. Uranium-233 is not known to have been used in 
nuclear explosives, and the cost of this material has thcrefore not been consid-
ered here. 
2. Natural urallium contains 0.7 per cent of uranium-235 whilc the main 
component is uranium-238. For use as a nuclear explosil'e the uranium·235 is 
usual1y enriched to 90·95 ptr cent. Scveral processes, i.e., gaseous diffusion, ther-
mal diffusion ami electromagnetic separation, hal'e been developed for this purpose. 
Of these, only the gaseous diffusion process is known to be applied :\t present. 
Thermal diffusion and electromagnetic separation "ere used for developing the 
first Uni ted States nuclear weapons, but both processes wcrc abandoned aftcr the 
Se<:ond World \Var because of high co>t". The total Uniled States investments 
in these two methods have been around $US 460 million (I) .• 
3. Thc gas centrifuge, which may pro,·e to be a useful separation tool, is 
still at the developm('ntal stage. 
4. The gaseous diffusion process is uscd today in France, the United King-
dom, the United Slates alld is believed to be used also in the USSR and China. 
This method il1yoh'es some 4,000 enrichment stages aud large aud costly plants 
based on advanced technology are required. The exact technology is largely 
classified. The USAEC operates today three such plants. The cost of the first 
plallt was arotmd $1,000 million, and of the two subsequent plants a total of 
$1,300 million, and it has been as'lImed th:ll the cost of one such plant of eco-
nomic size is in the range of S750 million to $1,000 million (2). 
5. The capacity of thcse three plants has recently been publishcd by thc 
USAEC." In terms of scparative c;l.]);l.city for producing highly enriched uranium-
235 the total was <loout 17 million kilogrammes per year of uatural uranium feed 
for the quoted 0.2531 per cent UT:lnium-235 content of the depleted residue. If the 
yearly operating costs amount to $500·600 million the corresponding cost in terms 
of separati,·c work units (i.e., per kg of natural ur<lnium fced for light enrich-
ment and Ihe quoted depl('(ion) is about $30 to $35 per kg 111Iit. 
6. The uranium·235 product is 4.5 grammes per kg of natural uranium and 
the separative work cost is $6,700 to $7,800 ]ler kg uranium-235, or a tolal cost 
of $11,000 to $12.000 per kg U·235 from natural uranium at $ZO ]ltr kg. Th('se 
cost estimates are in agreement lIith a statement made by the Forum Study Com-
mittee on Toll Enrichment (3 ) that the separative costs in new United States 
• Figures in parenthcses arc refcrcnc('s to documents in the li,t appended to 
this annex. 
a USAEC press rc!use, 14 June 1967. 
54 
diffusion plants need not exceed $30 per kg of separative work in the years to 
come, whether these plants are owned privately or by the USAEC. 
7. Some tw~n ty-five kilogrammes of weapons-grade uranium would be reo 
quired for the production of one nuclear warhead with a yield in the twenty-
kiloton range (4) . Uranium-Z35 is preferred over plutonium for the production 
of thermonuclear weapons. 
8. The gas centri fuge would on the other hand be suitable for producing 
small quantities of uranium-ZJ5. HowC\ler, Ihe current technology has been classi· 
fied by most countries conductillg centrifuge research, and up-to-date information 
regarding the status of the technolog}' and costs beyond those rel:aed to the origi-
nal Zippe machine (5) a re therefore sparse. A plant capable of producing fifty 
kilogrammes of 9O-per-cenl enriched uranium-Z35 per year would, according to 
this in formation (5) , cost around $130 million and have annual operating costs 
of about $13 million. With !O per cent annual in\·cstment charge the production 
costs would amount to $500,000 per kg uranium-Z35. 
P LUTONIUM-ZJ9 
9. Plutonium-2J9 is produced in a nuclear reactor when the uranium-2J8 con-
tained in the fuel elements is subjected to neut ron flux . Other, non-fiss ile pluto-
nium isotopes, par ticularly plutonium-240, are produced simultaneously, and tlle 
relative fraction of such isotopes increases with the irradiation t ime. Tn weapons-
grade ))ll1tonium the non-fissile fraction should be 10 per cent or preferably less, 
and this necessita tes fuel burn-ups below about 1,000 MWd/tU. For comparison it 
should be mentioned tha t the fuel bUrn-UI) in na tural uranium powcr reactors is 
an order of magnitude higher. 
10. It is estimated that sOllie eight kilogrammes of 95 per cent plutonium-Z39 
IlouM be required for the construction of one nuclear warhead with a yield 
around 20 kilotons (4). 
II. A complete p!uloniun!-239 production complex wou ld require a uranium 
refinery (alld evcntually a metals ingot plant ), a fuel fabrication plant, a reactor, 
a plutonium extraction plant, a plutonium metals reduction 1)lant alld related 
service facilities. 
12. The costs of a complex designed fo r integrated production of some eight 
kilogrammes (95 per cellt) plutonium-2J9 per year and concentrated around a 
40-50 !\{Wth heavy water cooled and moderated reactor with a throughput of 20 
tons metallic na tural fuel per year can be estimated as follows ( table I ): 
T.~DLE I. PRODUCTION COSTS FOil _ 8 KG WEAPOSS -GII.ADE PLUTO N I UM PER VF.AII 
(In SUS millions) 
A",,,,(1.1 
Capitul ol'~rotj"iI 
costs cos" R.I. 
Refinery and metals ingot plant ....... 2.50 1.75 (6) 
Fuel and fuel fab rication ..... ........ 1.50 0.60 (7) 
Reactor .... ... . ...... .. ...... 10.00 1.20 
PlutoniulII extraction ... ... .... 1.25 0. 17 (8) 
Plutoniull1 fabrication 0.25 0.18 (8) 
Sen·icc farilitie s .... ......... 6.50 0.87 (8) 
GIl.AND TOTAL ZZOO _ 4.80 
The reactor capital and op~rating costs are based 011 in formation concerning the 
Canadian reactor NRX (9). 
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13. Because of the small quantities involved, the plutonium recovery costs 
have ~en based on a batdl ion cxch;mge process and not on the COIII"elitional, 
continuous solvent extraction process emploYf'd for large-scale operation. 
14. A Swedish study made for the purpose of this rf'port concerning the cost 
of producing 40/80/160 kg of weapons-grade plutonium-239 per yror has been 
carried out (4). Plutonium production reactors in the power range 250-500 ~IWth 
and a 350 :;. . IWth power reactor have been considered, assuming that the reactors 
were to be moderated with heavy water and fuelled wilh natural uranium. The 
plutonium production reactor fuel clements arf' made up of metallic uranium rods 
dad in aluminium and the power production reactor is fuelled with uranium diox-
ide pellets clad in Zircaloy-2. The study docs not include investments in facili ties 
for uranium ore milling and concentration and is therefore based on a price of 
$8 per pound of the concentrate (UsOs) bought on the open market. It has been 
assumed that refuclling of the reactors can be carried out on-load. Table 2 below 
coven the power reactor alternative, and table 3 the plutonium production reactor 
alternative. 
TABI.E 2. PROIIUCTION COSTS FOR 40 AND 80 KC OF Wf .... l'QSS-<:RADF. PI.UTONIUM 
!'Elt YEAR IN A J50 M\VTII I'()WER REAcrQlt 
(Ill $US milliolls) 
Cal'il .. 1 A .... w.1 
C"IU COIU 
fucl, conversion and fucl element 
plant ........................•... 5.0 8.0 6.0 \5.0 
Reactor (additional costs, not needed 
for power) ...................... 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Reproccssing and plutonium com·cr-
siol! 28.0 3.0 32.0 4.0 
GRAND TOTAl. 34.0 12.0 39.0 21.0 
T AUl.E 3. PItQDUCTIOS COSTS FOR 80 ANI) 160 KG OF WE:AI'OSS·(;RADF. PI.UTONIUM 
P.l:H I'KAR IS PROD UCTION REACTORS 
(1" SUS millimu) 
Rnull)f' Ii~t: 
PI~I"~;"m pr6d"rt;<>~: 
f uel, conversion and fuel element 
plant ........................ .... 
Reactor ...................... 
Reprocessing and plutonium conver-
sion ..... .............. .......... 



















15. The costs o f producing weapons-grade plutonium in a small frac tion of 
the core of a 600 MWe power reactor of the CANDU·tYIlC using standard fuel 
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elements have also been considered, on the assumption that the cost of elcctrieity 
production should !)( independent of the plulOniull1 production, i.e., as if the com-
plete core comprised fud elements }idding maximum burn-up. This means lb. t 
the reactor operating costs related to ]"Iutoniulll production would be prollOriional 
to the costs of plutonium-producing fuel elements at least in the low quantity 
range, say 8-40 kg of weapons-grade plutol1illl1\ per year. It has also been assumed 
that a throughput of fue l corrl'silonding to two tons of U per )ear with a bum-up 
around 600 :\!\\'<V"IU would be required 10 produce oot" kg of weapons-grade 
plutonium. The calculations h:.we furthcr bcal based on 6,000 hrs reactor opera-
tion per year ami costs of fue l and fuel clement production of $72.50 per kg U 
contained. The resulting cost of plutonium before reprocessing would be $133,000 
per kg. T.king reprocessing costs in ti,e Swedish study (4), i.e., $70 per kg U, 
the cosu of $270,000 per kg wcapons-grade plutonium would result. 
16. Table 4 summarizes our results concernillg plutonium I'roouctioll . In 
figure XIV the tosts per kg are shown as a function of the production capacity. 
TABl£ 4. METAUIC WI:APOss-c ..... O£ PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION rosTS 
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PN>d"ct;Q" O,r,"I;"q ,,,,,ul"'~'" 
ClIPlItlly. N~",,''" Vt~ C_/'i,"1 CQ,,. chlI~q~) Irq I'M/ynr """ MI /I. ro,,, (~~~ y",r) (, ... Irq) 
8 ............ Production (SO) 22.00 4.80 0.90 
10-SO ... , .... . ... Power (600 MWe) 0.27 
40 ....... ..... Power (350) 34.00 12.00 0.39 
80 ............ Power (JSO) 39.00 21.00 0.31 
80 ............ Production (250) 77.00 7.40 0.19 
160 ............ Produclion (500) 87.00 9.50 0.1 2 
17. From the dat. arrived at for the costs of gaseous diffusion, and produc-
tion of plutonium-2J9, and in view of the lack of rel iable data concerning gas 
centrifuge costs, il would seem Ihat a count ry desiring to build one or a minor 
number of nuclear warheads IlCr year would go for the plutonium type. 
18. A sma!! programme, aiming .t Ihe production over a ten-YC!ar IlCr iod of 
ten warheads, each with a yield of about twenty kilotons, .... auld require a total of 
80 kg plutonium. The corresponding tOlal plutonium IlfOCllremOlt costs based on 
a SO kWth production reactor would comprise some $22 million in callilal costs 
and around $48 million for ollCration, altogether, Le., $7 milliun per year, or 
approximately $0.9 million per kg of plutonium. 
19. If an equivalent quantity of plutonium was 10 be produced in conjunction 
with electricity production ill a large (600 M\Ve) power reactor, the cor resJlonding 
total costs would amount to some $22 million, i.e., $2.2 million IlCr ye."lr, or :lround 
$0.27 million per kg of plutonium. 
ZO. A moderate programme, aiming at the production over a ten-year period 
of 100 nuclear warheads of the same si:te :15 abo\(, would, based on a 250 MWth 
production reactor with an output of 80 kg plutonium per year, invohe total costs 
of $151 million, of which $77 milliOIl would be capital costs and $74 million 
operating costs. The corresponding annual costs would be $15 million and the 
plutonium costs $0.19 million per kg. Doubling the production capacity to 160 kg 
per year aiming at the procurement of ZOO warheads over a ten-year period would 
result in capital and operating costs of $87 million and $95 million respectively. 
The annual costs would be $19 million and the plutonium production costs 
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21. From figure XIV it can be seen that plutonium production based on a 
large power reactor would be fa r more expensil'e when the production rate is 
increased. 
DESIGNING AND MANurACTUalNG 
22. The amount of published infonnation on problems related 10 warhead 
assembly is scverely limited by military secrecy. Some very general evaluations 
of the nature of the problem can, howe,·er. be made. Bomb construction includes 
slIch activities as detailed measurements of bomb material properties, weapOIlS 
design, fina l metallurgic.l1 treatment of explosi\'t$, manufacture of fusing and 
detollation equipment, etc. The fabri cation of plutonium bombs is complicated by 
se\'eral factors, such as complex metallurgy, toxicity and chemical reactil'ity of 
Ihe metallic charge. In addition, the design and construction of shaped charges 
for explosion detonation presumably represent challenging problems. I Iowever, 
various countries possess this technology since slliltlCd charges arc used in such 
weapons as the bazooka and for perforators, oil'\\I';1I casings and open hearth 
furnace tappers. 
23. According to one source ( 10) the cost of assembling from two to three 
bombs per year would comprise some $10 million in tal)ital investments and anllual 
operating COSt5 of some $5 million. According to the more recent Swedish study 
(4) the capital in\'estments in a factory for assembling ten .... ·arheads per year 
would be about $8 million and the anllual operating costs around $1 rniJ1ion. The 
Swedish figllres have been used in assessing the total costs gi\ell in the section 011 
various warhead production programmes below. 
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TESTING 
24. \Vithoul knO\\ing the completc requirements that a counlfy considering a 
first nuclear lest might Ie,,}, on the test Ilrogramme, the cost of tests can only he 
a~se$sed in a most general manner. 
23. The factors a country conducting a fi rst lIucltar tts t Illight consider arc: 
(Q) The en"ironment of the test, i.e., above the earth 's surface, on the sur-
face, undtrground or under water; 
(b) The diagnostics of Ihe explosion; 
( c) The weapons-clTccts tests to be made. 
26. Tests at or ncar the earth's surface (balloon- or to\\er-susrended, free-
fall or rocket-launched) would prO\'ide the greatest amount of dala for the lowe~t 
cost. The absolute cosls would, however, depend largely on the comple"ity of Ihe 
e"pcriments performed, the cost of accommodations and the number of l>col,le 
involved, and "ould therefore be difficult to state. 
27. A nation signatory to the limited test-ban treaty would be constrained to 
testing underground, either in a hole drilled for the purpose, or in a mine. A fe w 
e"amples of costs involved in connexion with such tests will be given below. 
28. A tcst " ith a ZO-kiloton bomb would rC<lui re a dr illed hole 1,100 feet deep 
and 90 inches in diametcr. United States costs for such a hole in dry tuff would 
be some $0.35 million. Drilling under other conditions could easily double the 
cosu. Costs for sealing to pre\'ent venting would ha,'e to be added. Few countries, 
ho\\e\'er , are known to ha\'e digging equipment for deep holes with this diameter. 
T he simplcst diagnostic tes t a country could conduct for an underground t~t 
would be to get a crude determination of yield. A determination good to about 
± 40 per cent can be obtained by using surface seismometers in the vicinity of 
zero-ground, and would cost a few thous:md dollars. A determination to about 
± 20 per cent can be obtaiued by digging a series of holes C:o\tending radially out-
ward from the device hole for the installa tion of accelerometers and seismometers. 
The determination would in this case cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
29. The best yield determ ination could be obtained by dri11ing back to the 
dcinity of the e" plosion and performing radio-chemical analyses of device debris. 
This procedure could easily be as vc.pensi\e as drilling the original hole. 
30. The Long Shot eH!nt, conducted at Amchitka Island in 1965 for seismo-
logical calibration of the Aleutian chain area, is a good example of the basic costs 
(exclusi\e of the explosion de\ ice) for such tes ts carried out in a remote area. 
The costs are broken down in table 5. 
T ARI.I: 5. COST 01' TIIY. Los(: SHOT EVt:ST 
(In SUS miliiOtJS) 
EXIII'1ratory "ork to d( tennine the feasibility of using the arca... 2.61 
E~tabli'hing the base .................................. ........ 4.50 
Drilling and scaling ............................... 1.87 
Emplaeing cquipm~nl in the hole......................... . 0.16 
Ali other expenditures. ................. .... .... ........... 1.52 
31. For comparison, it could be menti"ned that the USAEC l\e\'ada lest site 
represents an im-estment of $150 million, :md that AEC for the period I Ju[y 
1963 to 30 June 1966 spent about $200 million for underground testing, exclusive 
of the cost of the fissionah le materialuscd. 
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32. It would prcsumably be cheaper to conduct the tl:$t in an established mine 
~ince linle new digging and construction would be required for sub-shafts and 
zero room. The gaugcs for device diagnostics would be installed in the zero room 
enclosure. D<:vicc yidd measurements t."ln be made by gauges installed in the drift 
mined for dcvice emlliacemelll. The yield would be determined by hydrodynamic 
measurements. A minimal amount of diagnostic or dc\" ice Ilcsign and operation 
information can be obtained by r~ording the rate of rdease of energy from the 
device, i.e., the "Alpha". T he costs of a test conducted in a mine have been esti 
mated as shO\\ n in taMe 6. 
T ABL[ 6. (.(1ST OF "S UND[Rr;;lQU;';O WU.!'O;';S n:ST ,·r..aroltl.l[O IS AN I SE 
(fl. US doli/IrS) 
Access ............... ... ............ .. ...... . ............ . 
Headframe excnvalion and installation ............ .... ..... . 
Shaft and /Iri ft complex ... .......... .... ... ....... ....... . 
Zero room .......... ........ ........................ .. ... . 
Instrumentation in~tal1ation and oper.ttion . .... . ............ . 
Timing and fi ring inSlill1ation and ollCration ............... . 
Iftviee installation ................................. . 
Sternmillg ................................................ . 
Technical direction ........................................ . 











GlASD TOT,\I. 2,182,000 
33. These costs arc exclushe of the de" ice itsel f, the instrumentation record-
ing equipment and the timing and firing system, and arc based on costs for simi· 
lar type construction at the United States Kevada Test Sitc. 
34. According to Swedish estimates (4), the total COSU of testing one 20-
kiloton d~vice underground would ~mount to $12 million, and the costs of testing 
four such del'ices would amount to $15 million. 
35. According to the costs of the Long Shot event (table 5) and the ahove 
cost estimate for a test performed in a millc, the Swedish cost estimate may \I ell 
be a realistic onc. 
Cosrs rOil VAII.IOI'S W"IIIlUD l'ItODI'CTIOS rJlOGRAMMES 
Plrl/onium ~l"o,hr(ld protilfclion proyr(lfflmt 
36. BaSCI\ on tire estimated cost figures for plutonium ])roduction and warhead 
desig'n, manuf;.etllre and testing ghen aho\e, the total costs of a small programme 
(one 2O-kiloton warhead per year Oler ten ye:lTs) and a moderate programme (ten 
2O-kiloton warheads per year Ol'er ten years) arc shown in table 7. The small 
programme wOlild cost $11 million ]JoCr year, i.e., $11 million per warhead, whereas 
the moderate programme would cost $20 million per year, resulting in a warhead 
unit price of $2 million. If the small programme could be combined l\ltlt plutonium 
production in a large flOwer reactor, the annual costs might he reduced to 
$6 million, and consequently the warhead unit costs to $6 million. 
Production programmt inr/wding thtnnonuc/tor warlrtods 
37. The. escalation of the total warheads production costs resulting from the 
construction and operation of a diffusion plant for enriching uranium-2J5 and 
the development and !tSling of thermonuclear weapons is well demonstrated in the 
French examplc shown in table 8. The gaseous diiJusioll plant was built aftcr 1960. 
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TABl.E 8. COSTS OF TOTAl. PR£SCU NUCI..EAR W,\RnEADS PROGRAMME-
(In SUS mil/ions) 
To 1960 ..... . 
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• It is expected that costs will stabilize a fter 1970. The figures are taken from 
ref. (11). 
CoSTS or OJ;!.IVEll:V ~"EIIICI.r.s 
G(lIlrol (Qllside,.otioIlS 
38. The basic premise taken herein is that nuclear forces are created to 
achieve military and political objectives which require the force to be credible and 
effective. Thus the costs of approaches employing weapons ass('mb1ed and hidden 
on enemy territory, delivered by ship or by commercial ai rcraft or other unortho· 
dox means of delivery are ruled out. Consideration is therefore limited to nuclear· 
capable military bombcr aircraft or ballistic missile forces which can playa 
"strategic" role. In addition to the delil'ery vehicles PI'''' Sl!, there must be created 
the necessary bases; launching sites; supporting syst('ms (maintellance, logistics, 
defence etc.); and command, control and communications system, to establish a 
force of military and political value which is safe from unauthorized or accidental 
employment. 
39. Range rt'(luiremCllts, together with th(' physical characteristics of the 
nuclear weapon, will affect the size of the delh-ery vehicle (i.e., relatively sm:li1 
:lnd sophisticated I\e:lpons for small vehicles). The characteristics of the adver-
sary's targets and the nature of the defences employed to pr<>lect them will play 
an important part in determining the type of force and the requi red accuracy of 
,,-capon delivery. Early warning systems would have to be prodded for these 
nuclear forces, backed up by :lnti·aircraft defences, interceptors, dispersed air· 
fie lds etc., for a bomber neet, and h3rdening or mobility for missiles. 
40. In formu lating the costs for a proposed programme the cost of acqllisitioll 
of the delivery systems, the costs of all of the related support systems discussed 
abO\'e, and the costs of oper:ltion and maillt\!nance ought to he included. In the 
case of bombers, supporting equipmc-nt and facilities, including airfields, refuelling 
planes, large maint('nance and ol·erhaul dellots, etc .. are neetk'd. In the case of 
missiles, launch, overhaul and mainteuance facilities are required. Missile launching 
submarines require their own supporting fac ilities, including shipyards and/or 
tenders. It is possible 10 have the relatively low acquisition costs obtained through 
purchasing old aircraft offset by higher operating costs. ~lissile system operating 
costs, which are lower than aircraft, are offset by the generally higher acquisition 
cost. 
41. From another standpoint, there are also the costs needed to maintain Ihe 
effectivencss of the force in light of its obsolescence, caused in part by counter· 
measures triggered by its deployment. The latter costs can consist of extensive 
modernization costs of the deployment vehicles, such as ad:ql\ing aircraft to cope 
with an adversary's air defence, or the replacement of the force by succeeding 
generations of de livcry vehicles. 
42. The accuracy with which delivery vehicle costs are predicted has bef,n 
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notoriously poor. Heavy overruns of tlCpenditures have been the rule rather than 
the tlCccption, and have been concurrent \lith lengthy delays in Ihe projected 
time tables. Many instances exist of the deployment of extremely costly but 
already obsolescent weapons systems, which were \lithdrawn a vcry short time 
after thcir initial deployment. Furthermore, while it is not always correct, it can 
be generally assumed that the accuracy of cost and time est imates for hoth the 
development and production of delivery \'ehicles is a fun ction of prior related 
experience. O\'errunS are therefore more likely to be incurred \lhen a country 
embarks on its first generat ion development. 
43. The lime needed to develop a delivery system depends 011 the exis ting 
industrial base and related experience, and would. in most caSl!S, take at least ten 
years fo r reasonably industrialil:oo nations. Costs can be spread over time, but 
peaks occur at certain points, Obsolescence and countermeasures costs are related 
to the time factor. 
44, Mone!.1ry costs do not, by themselves, give a realistic picture of the 
necess.1ry effort in terms of over-all resources. A siZ<lble tecl1ll010gical base is 
needed to create and maintain a force of delh-cry w:hicles. Included here are the 
necessary skilled workers, engin('Crs, scientists and managers, fabricat ing facilities, 
exlltrimental facilities, test ranges, etc. Even if major components Com be pur-
chased abroad, the delivery system must be integrated into a workable whole, and 
this process requires \lIe skills of a large number of Quali fic:d ~rsons. 
45. Licensed production abroad tend! to increase costs because of language 
and measuremcnt standards, translation, Ira\'el time, labour unfamiliarity with 
advanced teclul0logical Ilrocesses, royalty payments, small production rUIIs and lack 
of cstablished industry \I ith its tools and labour skills. 
46. It should be noted that the French and Unitc:d Kingdom programmes 
a re aimed at the tstablishment of a credible modern force ; while thcy are sm,,]] 
COmllared to the Uni ted States effort, they are nevertheless judged by responsible 
officials in those countries as providing the lower limit of a suitable strategic 
nuclear force. The Uni ted States expenditures in this field represent fin effort in 
order of magnitude costlier than the combined United Kingdom- French pro-
grammes. This is due to hath the preponderantly larger United States forcc 
invoh'ed and the much longcr time ~riod this force has been in ex istcnce. The 
o\'C!'·alJ delivery vehicle cxpenditures for these three nations are estimated as: 
France ( 1960-1970)-$2.780 million; United Kingdom ( 1956-1967)-$4,107 million ; 
and United States ( 1948· 19iO)-$1 10,5OO million. Undoubtedly. leu ex~nsh'e 
prog r.Jmmes can be envis.1ged for other countries in other ci rcumstances. However, 
in general , even a modest indigenous delivery vehicle programme including nuclear 
'I capons would entail expenditures of no less than $1,500 million. 
47. Many natiOIiS :Ilready have a present or easily reali~able delh'ery vehicle 
capabil ity of some sort, such as aging bomhcrs, short-rangc figh ter·bombers and 
large space rockets, Howcver, given plausible interest in deploying credible forccs 
coupled \\ ilh Ihe strategic requirements at hand, few of thcse nati"lIs actually ha\'e 
an acceptable nuclear delhery \'ehicle (12) , 
COSTS OF ELEMENTAllY DI!LI\'EItV S\' STEMS 
Aircraft 
48, The 101\est level of expcnditure for such a system could be achic\·ed 
through, say, purchasing a force of thirty to fifty Canberra, B·57, or similar 
bombers, This type of aircraft can carry nuclear weapons, although unrduelled 
range is limited. 
49. Tilt acquisition aud operating costs of such a system halc been esti· 
matcd flS follows (in millions of US dollan) ( 13): 
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Aircraft, spares, tankers and related tquipment. ..... 
Protection; dispersed basing, simple pent:tr.ltion aids, 













SO. As an example of production costs, a B-29 propelleT·(lriven bomber pro-
duced ill the United States costs $1.2 million plus an almost equivalent value of 
government material ( 14). 
Missiln 
51. An elementary surface- ta-su rfaee missile force can be cOllsidered to con-
sist of approx imately fifty short-range or intermediate-range missiles in soft 
emplacements. Such an elemenlar), force is likely to have low reliabilit), and could 
probably only launch a small fraction of its missi les in a co-ordin:ltcd atl..ek 
Since it is unlikt;ly that a missile force can be purchased at preWlt, indigenous 
development would be rc<]uired even if certain major compouents such as the 
boosters might be purchased. Guidance and control of the boosler is required in 
order to make the missile a credible strategic threat; the developmcnt of these 
s)'stems is considered the most critical and expensive (IS). A typical industrialized 
nation might spend from eight to ten years on such a programme (1 5). 
52. The acquisition and operating costs of such systems with missile ranges 
of 500 and 1,500 n.mi., respectively, have bttn estimated as follows (in millions 
of US dollars) : 
Aeq .. i';ti.,. tNl, A .... ..,1 ol'ndli"g CO"~ 
$/111 ...... ; 1,5/1/1 ... ..,;. 5011 .. ... , 1.500 ...... i. 
'._/It '~~/I~ ' ._/It ~d"/1t 
Missiles, including da'd-
opment, procuremerot 
and 50ft si tes deploy-
ment (16) ............ 400·500 745-860 5 I. 
Protection . . ............ 4. 4 • 
TOTAl. 440-540 785-900 5 I. 
53. The United States Thor is an example of an carly strategic missile pro-
gramme. T his 1,500 n.mi.-range missile was deployed at soft sites in tht: United 
Kingdom for sc,"eral years. The C051 of development was somew~t lower than 
normal, since the Thor shared several of ils systems with the Atlas missile in 
that the propulsion systems were very similar, and the Thor re·tntry vehiclt'$ were 
identical with the carly Atlas re·entry \·ehicles. The total costs of the programme 
have been estim.1.ted at $600 million (16). 
54. The British Blue Streak programme was comparable to the Thor in that 
it was a soft-based liquid propell:lnt missile. Tilt: Blue St re1k had a design range 
of 2.500 n.mi. Due to time· table sliPllages, COSI overruns amI Ihe recognized obso-
lescence and vulnerability of soft basing and slo\1 reaction time, the Blue S treak 
was cancelled during its development, after approximate expenditures of $300 mil-
lion ( 17, 18). It was estimatcd that an additional $1,700 million would have been 
expended to complete its development and to deploy a force from soft si tes in over 
eleven years (18, 19). British missile costs have on several occasions escalated and 
resulted in programme cancellations (20,21, 22). 
S5. The total acquisition cost for a force of thi rl~ Atlas SQuadrons with 
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some 140 misSIlu .... ith launch facilit ies IS estimated at $4,900 million (23). Th is 
is about $35 million per missile. Resources requi red in terms of capital investment 
for production and cOIl ~t ruction alone is about $153 million IJer squadron after 
delelopment is completed (24). The cost of an Atlas missile vehicle wi thout war-
heads is $1.9 milliOn (23). A soft Atlas launch facility costs Ol'cr $..77 million, 
and establishment of Ihe facility involvcd a massive complex industrial effor l 
lasting some 1110 yean (25). Each Atlas costs $1 million per year to maintain, 
with eighty trained mcn to support every missile (26). 
CosTS OF MEDIUM-LEV1tL DELIVEItV SYSTEMS 
Aircraf t 
56. A medium-le~tI aircraft del ivery system can be considered to consist of a 
force of high performance aircraft, willi thei r rela ted tankcrs, bases, maimenance 
faci litics, command and tOTltrol system, etc. The French Mirage I V A bomber 
system i~ an cxample of such a force. The ai rcraft was an outgro .... th of a Mirage 
fig hter of Ihe mid-1950s, took more than six years to develop and deploy, and 
will be: 11hased Otlt by b<llIislic missiles in the: 1970s. The total aowisition costs are 
exp«ted to be around $940 mill ion, and the annual operating costs around 
$100 million (II). The lotal costs of the Mirage force including operation over 
ten year! could therefore he closc to $2,000 million. 
57. The British V-bomber fo rce, comprising three models of suhsollic medium 
bombers is another example of medium-level airc raft del ivery systems. Approxi-
mately 300 bombers wcre built of which probably less than 200 .... ere operational at 
anyone time. A prolJOrtioll of the force is equipped Idth the Blue Steel ai r_to-
surface missile. The total acquisition tosts hale ~n est imated at $ I.soo million, 
inclusive of the Blue St«l, and the annual operatioll co~ts at SIZO million. The 
British, in gmcral, hal'e had scvere problems in de\'eloping and maintaining the 
capabilit ies for producing ad\'anced ain::rnft (27). 
58. One estimate put the price of an early-production B·47 at $.1,4 mill ion 
plus an almost com lmrable "alue of government-furnished elluillment (28) . T he 
cost of one hour's flying is $500 (29). An examina tion of the United States B-47 
programme relcals some idea of the rcsour(eS required to undertake such a pro-
gramme. Employment at Roeing's \ Vichita, Kansas, plant was above 22,000, several 
thousand in cx(ess of the force .... hkh turned out a record 100 B·29s a month 
in the closing phase of the Second World War. Whm the go-ahead .... as given 
on the B-47, employment was only 1,500 workers (30). 1\ 3-million-square-foot 
plant, closed 011 \lar's end, was rcolenw and housed $29 mill ion worth of ma-
chinery. Tn addi tion, large \Iart imc plants .... ere reactivated by Douglas and Lock-
hew for the produrtiOIl of B-47s with BOcing-furnished ellginccring' and tool-
ing (31). The initial 11-47 tooling at Seattle alone cost $52.5 million with a similar 
COSt at Wichita. 
Missilt.f 
59. The Minuteman t, which is deployed in hard ullderground launch sites 
can be cOflsiclertd an example of a medium-len'l 5,000 n.mi.-r.lI1ge missile system. 
\Vltile ac tual ~I in\lteman I procurement totalled o\er 800 missiles, the procure-
ment costs for the "fint batch" of aJlproxim:llely fifty can be e<timatcd at $2 mil· 
lion each (32). It shou ld be noted tha t the cost of basing a ~linlltem:11l is approxi-
matcly $3 million. exclusive of the cost of the missile (33). For a for(e of fif ty 
Minuteman I missi le~, the mis~ile procurement costs including delelopmetl t would 
be $1,100 million; the co~t s of b.'lsing in h:J.r(i etnplaCetnetlt about $150 million. 
Adding annual operating rosts of $5 million (34), brings the total costs to 
$1,300 million o\'er a ten-~t'ar period, or $130 million per year. 
60, The French SSBS missile system is similar to M. inuteman 1 in mally 
respects, the major clilTercnce heing that the SSBS has a 2,000 n.mi. maximum 
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rang~. It is expected that approximately twenty-five missiles" ill be deployed in 
hardened underground emplacements. Since Ihe ssns programme is far from 
completed, the programmed acquisition costs ;He liable to overrun, and ol>cratillg 
costs must be considered. An estimate of the procurement costs is $700 mil-
lion (35). The SSBS programme will co\·er a period of <llmost t('n years to 
operational deployment, and was bnilt upon a h35ie research rocket capability (36) . 
Industrial and resource reo:[uirement, especially tcst facilities, arc ('xltnsh'e (37). 
6 1. The tot;!1 acquisition cost for a force of fourte~n Titan squadrons COlll-
prising 140 Titan I and Titan II missiles is ~stimated at $4,900 million. Resources 
required for construction of fourteen squadrons is $796 million (38). As a 
general rul~, for strategic ballistic missiles, 80 per cent of the total cost is taken 
by ground-based facilities (39). The industri31 and resource effort requi red to 
build one hardened launch complex with nine missiles in underground silos in-
volves the usc of large-scale earth-moving equipment, special ized fuel-handling 
equipment, etc., and is ronghly comparable to putting a ten-storey building under-
ground (25). T he Titan missile production facility at Dem·er costs about 
$52 million (40). 
COSTS o~ A SOPIIISTICATRtI t1fJ.IVERV S\'STEM 
Aircraft 
62. The only sophisticated bomber aircraft delivcry system presently under 
devdopmcnt is the FB-llI, ill the Uni ted States. The estimated costs for the 
acquisition of a force of 210 aircraft equippcd with SRAM air-to-surface missiles 
are given as $2, 173 million (41). It should he noted that these est imates arc suh-
ject to further overruns, aud that the FB- Ill is a derivative of the F-llI, thus a 
major portion of its development cost was charged off as part of the fighter 
development programme (42). The operat ing costs of this iorce up to 1971 wil! 
be $342 million (4 1) . 
63. The United Kingdom cancclled an advanceo:\ supersonic bomber (TS R.2) 
because of escalating and intolerable costs. It is rstimateo:l that 150 aircraft would 
have cost $2,000 million, at a unit rate of $14 million (43). 
64. A modcl has been derived for computing monetary, manpo\\er and facility 
requirements for supersonic combat aircraft of up to 100,000 pounds gross 
weight (44). Cost data, calculated from these models, for a hypothetical aircraft 
of 65,000 pounds maximum takc-oll weight would be;lS follows: 
Design and development .............. . .. . .... . . . . $520 million 
Engineer man-hours through prototype ........... . 12 million man-hours 
Factory employmC"llt with a production rate of 12 
units pcr month .. .. ..... . .. ............. . . ... . . 13,200 
Factory fioor-space requirement with a production 
rate of 12 units per month ............ . 3,120,000 sq. ft. 
Missi/n 
65. An example of a small-size sophisticated missilc del ivery system is the 
French MSBS system to consist of three missile- launching nuclear submarines, 
each armed wi th sixteen missiles of 1,500 n.mi. range. T hree submarines are 
needed to assure that two of them arc on station at all times. The procurement 
costs for this strategic nuclear force has been estimateo:l at $1,000 million (35), 
and the estimate for the annual operating costs is $20 million. According to 
reference ( 11 ) Ihe total French costs for missile-launching nuclear submarines 
and the MSBS and SSBS system will through 1970 be $1.840 million, which is 
slightly higher than the tota l of the ssns costs given in chapter 2.3.1.2 ($700 mil-
lion) and the above procurement costs ($1,000 million). It should he noted tha t the 
estimated costs gh·en below arc subjcrt to possible orerruns. In addition, the 
66 
Msns and the ssns share many components, so that the development costs arc 
not always easy to distinguish. 
66. An example of a large force of sophisticated delivery vehicles is the 
United States l\avy's Polaris programme. The ultimate deployment of this force 
will total forty-one submarines carrying sixteen missiles each. The missiles have 
been developed and procured in three versions: A-I, A-2 and A-3. The first of 
these has already been phased out. The Polaris A-2 \\i1l be replaced by the new 
Poseidon missile itt the future, necessi tating modificat ions to the submarines, as 
\\ell as the de\·elopment and procurement of the missiles. The estimated costs of 
the Polaris programmes, including the missiles, submarines and supporting facili· 
ties, are expected to exceed $13,000 million by 1970 (45). 
SU~fMAIIY Of O£LIVEIIY \'EHlQ.E COST DATA 
67. A summary of procurement and Ol}('ration costs fo r the var ious categories 
of delivery \'ehicle systems is ghoen in table 9. 
AN EXAMPI.E OF ESCAlATI~C: COSTS AND COUNTt:ltlol[ASUIIES 
United States deliver.\' v(lIide (ostsb 
68. The list of aircraft deployed and programmed in this category includes 
the following: D-36, D-47, D-50, B-52, 8-58, Fll-IIl, KC-97 and KC-13i These 
aircraft exceed 4,500 in number. Added to these are the Rascal, Hound Dog, 
Quail and SRAIII, an missiles with procurements in the hundreds. In addition, 
there were several aircraft de\'eloped either as prototypes, such as the XB·60 and 
Xll.70, or produced in limited quantities, such as the 8-45. Several air-Io-surface 
missiles (Skybolt and Goose) were cancelled in development. An estimate of the 
Rand D procurement. and base constnlction costs associated \';th the above, is on 
the onler of $28.000 million. The estimated operating costs associated with the 
deployed aircraft systems arc on the order of $31,500 million. These operating 
costs do not include the anticipated operating costs of the FD·III force, nor the 
cost of the logistic and defensive forces required for the support :l!Id protection 
of the offensive forces. The strategic missile costs include the Rand 0 and 
acquisition of missiles and the construction costs of the missile sites (soft and 
hard) and the missile suhmarines and their supporting ships. Included among the 
ballistic missile systems are: Thor, Jupiter, Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris and 
Poseidon. In addition, there were several cruise mi5Siles de\eloped (some of these 
were deployed for varying lengths of time). including Mace, Regulus, Snark and 
Navaho. The estimated i!1\'estment costs associated with these systems arc 
$37,000 million. 
69. The operating costs associated with the missiles and their test acth·ities 
are e$\im;lted to be $14,000 million. 
70. The United States delivery vehicle costs can be Sl1!nmari7.ed as follo\\'s: 
Strategic aircra ft systems: 
Acquisition cost .. 
Operating cost, 1950-1970 
Strategic missile systems: 
Acquisition cost ........... ...... ....... . . . 










b United States Department of Defense 1967 Appropriation Hearings. 
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TABLE 9. SUM~IARY OF nrL IVE.RY V£IIICl.£ l'NOCUREM £NT ASD OPnATIOSS COSTS 
(/n $US mil/iOM) 
Syll(O" f4f(tIDf? S~ .. lf '" duc.,I'''''~ 
Aircraft, elementary ........... 30-50 bombers (Canberra, B-57) ............................... . 
{
50 missiles in sort emplacement, 500 n.mi. range . ............... . 
~r'l I 50 missiles in soft cm])lacemenl, 1,500 n.mi. range .............. . 
• ISS! e. e ementary ........... US Thor missile ....... ........ ............................... . 
13 US Atlas squadrons (-140 missiles) ....................... . 
A' f cd' I I JSO-6O French Mirage IV bombers .............................. . 
Ircra I, m fUm- eve .... ·· .. l 300 British V-bombers (3 types) wilh air-to-surfaee missiles .... . 
j50 ;\!inuteman I. in hard emplacement, 5,000 n.mi. range ........ . ~fi ssil e. medium-level., ...... . 2S French SSBS in hard emplacement, 2,000 n.mi. range ........ . 14 US Titan squadrons (-140 missiles) ....................... . 
Aircraft, sophisticated ...• , .... 210 US FB-Ill with SRA:\! air-to-surface missiles ............ . 






























( Iotal to 1971) 
20 
Not a"ailable 
71. Through the fiscal yC".1r 1965 the United States h;ul illlC'Sted l1('arl), 
$~3.000 million (or the research and development. procurement. and related military 
construction associated " ith the lleallOtlS currentl), in tlte .trategit retaliator), 
(orccs. including: 










{or 14 \Iings (6.10 UE alrcratl) of 8 ·52 heav) bombers 
for 2 lOoings (fiO UI': aircraft) of 8 ·58 medium bomben 
for 2 XB·70 tcst ai rcraft 
(or the flee t o f 43 SQuadrons of KC· 1.15 t:wkers, u<ed (or aerial 
refuell ing of the 8·52 and 13·58 fo rcts 
for thc Quail deco)'s and the Hound Dog air·lo-surface missiles 
used to Ol.id the 8·52·s penetrate to ta rgets 
for IJ squadrons of Atlas liquid· fuelled miMi]~ 
for 12 5quadrons of Titan liquid·fuelled missiles 
for ]6 !.Iinuteman I :md 4 :\Iinutcman II squadrom. rOlllpnsmg 
1.000 missiles, funded through the fiscal year 1965. The Minute· 
m:11l force to be achieved by 1969, including ret rofit, is csti· 
mated to cost $11,100 million 
for the fleft of ~ I Polaris submarines .md their SUI)llOrt ships 
COllnltrmrosNrrs 
72. Counterme;lsurc costs for missiles arc considered to he as~"ci" t etl "itlt til<': 
oIf1,lo,llllcnt of au ." BM system ;lIId reactions to ABM deplo)'mellt~. In the Unitcd 
~ta t cs, the ~ike ·X system, consisting of both area :md point !Idellces, has been 
U1l1ler dC\'elopmcnt for 5t\·er:l.1 years. Thc ilcqui~iliOfl costs of the Nike-X s)'Sltnl 
w,1l !Iepend on Ihe extC1lt to \\hich it might be deployed. Estimated e(lSI~ range 
(rom :lppro~imaiely $4,000 million for :l light d~ll loymelll :lgaiust a limited threat. 
10 UI1\\anls of $40,000 million for a full deploymf"1lI against a soJlhi~lk:lted threat 
CJ11 1110}ing a \'ariet), of (lCIlet rat ion :,ids. To be fuHy eliecti,.,::. an t\lUd sy~tcl1l 
mu~t he sllpple1n('nlcd by a ci\'il defeuce prog ramlllc. pro\·iding bl1oll\ shelters. 
The cost of such a prngr;llnme is not included in the abo\'e fi<:ur('s. Penetration 
Ol.id ~ ilre !Iesigned to increase Ihe dfccliI'ellCss of attacking forces aJ,!a inH tar~Cl~ 
\ldendl-d hy ABM~. The Unittd States has spent o\-er $1.200 mi\lion on n'se:,rrh 
and del elopnKnt in this area. lJcployment of thtse dC\"kts "i!1 eutail additional 
('Ost5. 
PROCltIlJlMF.ST COSTS SliMMMlY 
Mod.-st lIudraT (OfIJril)' 
7J. As a ir.llne ot' rcierenc(', it h:l.5 been assumed that a eredihle but 1I100kst 
nnclear capability could comprise a (1c1i1'erable warhead and an elementary dciivtry 
s}"tcm. including in termediate·rallgc missiles and some ?ircraft. The assume,l 
r ( rce is made up .... f the following units: 
Thir ty to fifty bombers of the Canberr:1 or 8 ·57 t)lle, ilur('hascu abroad; 
Fifty medium'rauge missiles of the 1,500 n.mi.·rangt- in 50ft cmlllaccmcnts. 
developed and produced indigenously; 
One hundred nuclear wt-apons. dCI·e1oped. and produced indigcl10l1s1y. 
74. AceonJing to the prt-violls tables 7 and 9. tht total minimum c"~t "f 
llr'l', iring such a force deployed o\'er a ten·year period » ouM he $1.700 million. 
"hith can be broken down a5 follows (in millions of US dollars): 
\\'arheads (100) 
Aircraft (30·50) 










75. These rough tost es timates for a modest nuclea r force hal·e Ilcen h;ised 
on the ~cielltirlc, tedmkal and industrial capabilities of 11 modern industrial nation, 
which has already ;I. good experi t'nt'e in nuclear power, ;l.ircraft and space tech-
nology. The costs of sllth ;I. force I'o'ould obviously rUll higher if a ilomc,tic imll1S-
tri;ll b;l.se had to be estilblished for the development ;md proouttioll of the delh·ery 
system. 
76. The above warhead costs a rc based on the S\ledish study (·n, Idlkh 
probably covers relatively crude testing of one single type of warhe;\{1. .·\n ex ten-
sion of the weapons programme to include production and testing of hoth 
st ratcgit ami tattical lIeapons could, 115illg the French programme through 
1960 ( II ) as an example, increase the total costs by some $50-60 million (sec also 
sections on designing and mmmfacturing and on testing). 
SIIIOI/, high-IIIIO/ily mulrar force 
77. A Polish study has been undert;l.ken for the pur pose of this report to 
es timate the costs of a small, high-qu;llity nuclear force (48). !\ pr01,;ram1lle 
comprising hlO stages of five years' duration h;l.s been envisaged. By the l'nd of 
the first stage ( 1968- 1972) a nuclear fo rce of from tl'll to fifteen "ornbers :md 
from fifteen to tllenty nuclear weapous \\Ollld be established, and during thc 
second stage ( 1973-1977) the force wouM be extemkd to includc from twcnty 
to thi rty thermonuclear weapons, 100 interrnediate-r~ngc missiles and tllO missile-
I~unching nuclear submarines. The tot;tl costs of this programme b;lsed on 
domestic industry and home f!(;onomy resources Ilouid amount to $5,600 million, 
resul t ing in average annual tosts of $560 million. 
78, The pictured Polish programme ( 48) is a scaled-down version of the 
French programme (48). The cost es timate is considerably lower than the alll);lTel1l 
('xpcnditures in France and the Uni tt'd Kingdom, both of IIhith arc in the eour$C 
oi establishing high-qual it)' nuclear forces of moderate sizl'. 
;9. F rcllch costs for the milita ry nuclear programme to 1969 have I,eell esti-
m31ed at $8,400 mill ion ( 11 ), ;l.ud the United Kingdom cost to 1%9 al ;l sirnil:lr 
amount." 
ro. Annnal outlays uf $50 million lIere rcpresentati IC of the early Frend. 
programl1le, but these later rose to as much as $1,000 million for a single year. 
8!. The actual annu31 costs of the nuclear forces in some countries arc 5hOlln 
in tal)le 10, Thl' costs arc also s iven relative to the annual defence bndgets :lIId 
Gl\P. 
82. CompariSOI1 of the figu res given in tabk 10 should be made "ith e;l1l\i .. n. 
partly because the)' refer to 1'0lmtrics at different stages of nuckar \le;111011~ 
d(,l·etopment, and partly bctause the size of the respceth·e nuclear forte~ is not 
known. 
AU.ocATtOS OF 1I£5OI.:IlC£S 
8.1. If the C:lpacity to produce a lluc1ear forte is to be developed indigenously, 
and this is assumed to be the objective, the materials and manpower requirements 
represent 110t only major financial outlays but, more significantly, , ·ery highly 
specialized resources. Even for an industrialized country, the ecollomic diffitul ties 
are likely to be more formidable in these terms than in money terms (46). 
84. The available publit literature on nuclear weapons development docs not 
detail the resource reljuirements for the ;,cquisi lion and operaliou of a military-
• T he United Kingdom eo~t s arc not strictly comparable, sinte three bomber 
types were del'eloped, procured and deplo)cd O\·er a longer ptriod. 
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TAB!.t. 10. An !;AL COSTS or NUCLEAR FORCES 
Pa,od of T,,'«I (",,, 
C~~,,"y I"", e," IUS m,I/,,,",) 
francc ......... ......... 1960-1964 2.400 
1965-1970 5,200 
United Kingdom .... . 1%2-1963 'SO 
1965-19{16 .150 
1966-1967 300 





















~i!-:1\ifi(a11t cOlpOlbili ty. Therc are, h,.",c\"l'r, numerous rderences suggcsting the 
\arj(-ty, kind OInd QUOlli t)' of resources needed. 
8j. For a nuclear weapons programme, the b«sic ingredients arc raw matc-
rials, a corps of skilled engineers and e,.-\lCr t physidst~ allli a modern industrial 
base (47). Sophisticated dcli\"ery systems are (.'(lual1y demanding of high-quality 
materials :md skills. 
86. A study of the numiJ.cr of scientific and tec!mical personnel required by 
01 nation to build insta llat ions in which nnclcar wOIrheads could be prodllc~d on a 
continuous basis has estim;lted that approximately 1,300 engineers and 500 scierl-
lists wou ld be needed. 
87. For production of intermediate·range ballistic missiles. blimat~s suggest 
that mall]lower requiremCllts for Il'chnicOlI and skilled personnel \\O\lld run higher 
than those for lIucle~ r weapollS. To produce and deploy fifty missiles of lhe inter-
mcdiOlle-range size, il is estimated tll" t a peak labour force of 19,000 would be 
need\!d, o\"er 5,000 of them scientists and engineers. Skill calegories \,ouid in-
dude physicists, aerodynamics, mechanical ;mt! olhn engineer~ and large lIumiJ.crs 
of skilled production workers, including machine oper,llors and welders. 
88. Thc assumed bomber fl~c t would require at a minimum 1 or "1 million 
()r mOTe engineering m;\n-houTS of skilled and unskilie,1 labour just 10 ilSsemb1c. 
The design and de\"l'l\Jpmcllt stage would ~bsorb an ;lIl,lilional 1 millioll or more 
engineering man-houn, which \,ould ill\"olve highly skilled eliorts ill aerody-
namics, stress analysis, dc~ign work and fHght -teSling. 
89. For Ihe devdopment of lhe Swedish AJ 37 Viggcn :,nack-fighter lhe 
IlCak manpower cflorts in J966 amounted to a total of 2,500, including 200 scien-
tis ts. At a production rail' of, for e,.-ample. thir ty-three plOlnes per year about 4,000, 
including 400 scientists and engineers, "ill be employed in the produclion. 
90. For lIlost countries becoming a nnclear power. the costs oi allocatioll of 
resources would be more significant than Ihe fin;!nda] costs, and eonsidl'r<lbly 
more difficul t 10 delail and evaluate. Nei ther is a "bill of goods' available for the 
assumed nuclear c<l pability; nor a rc adequate dala a"ailablc 10 show nOll iollal 
capabilities in the types of specialize(l, high·quality resources required by nuclear 
p rogramme~. 
91. The m:mpo,\('r Tt'tluiremcnts given above [or developing and manufac-
luril'g fifl) bombers and for designing, building alI(I deploying fifty missiles corre-
spolld roughl)' to 7,000 ~ciClltisb, engineers and technicians. This nUll1ber of 
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specialists "ould represent a large percentage of all s~ien ti sts and ellgineers avail-
able in lIlan} countries. 
92. The establishment of the nudear force envisaged in the Polish study 
would require that almost the entire corps of sciultists, engineers and technical 
personnel assigned to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as nearly all 
nuclear-equipment-producing industries in Poland, would be absorbed by the 
we"]lOns programme. Additionally, the most highly qualified fraction of all scien-
tists, engineers ;lIld technicians ;wailable and a major fraction of, for in<tance. 
the chemical. metallurgical and electronics industries would have to be allocated 
to tJle weailons programme. 
ECONOMU; 1~11'1.[C"T1UNS 
93. The derivation uf the data presented in the g raph in figure VIII of 
section II of the report is explained beluw, and the actual \alues plolted arc 
given in table Il.' 
94. The United Nations SIDtisti(DI Yearbook, 1965, table 192, presents fur 
a large number of CQuntries reported expenditures by central and regional gov-
ernments in several fields. For most countries, expenditures 011 defence, education 
and health appear as separate items. The amounts arc there quote\1 in national 
currenc), units. They have been converted to equh'alent Uni ted States dollars 
using rates of exchange quoted in table ISS of the saUle Yearbook. \\'here rates 
of exchange 11;we varied, a selected mean figurc has been used. The year 1964 
was selected as the latest for which most reports appellr. \Vhere the most recent 
information was for another year, that is indicated in table I!. \Vhere there is 
no report [or any item the country is omitted from that list. It may be observed 
from the lists lhat the items are incomplete for two major cou11lries, France and 
Italy, and this in the g raph in figure Vll! of the report causes some di~l'lace­
ment to the lef t of the lines for health and education. The lack of information 
from smaller countries has negligible effect. 
95. In the grallh, horiwutal liues are drawn corresponding to the t\\'o illus-
trative expenditures of $170 million (US equi,alent) per year for a modest 
nuclear force, and of $560 million per year for a small high-quality force. The 
graph shows that these levels \\ould represent a "ery large comllOllent of the 
total defence expenditure for all e:otcept llbout the lel1 largest, that is, six coun-
tries be)'ond the existing Iluclear-weapons Powers. About twenty countries have 
higher total defellce expenditures than that for the modest nuclear armament of 
$170 million per year. 
96. It thus api'Cars that there arc only "bout six countries in the world, other 
than the five nuc.lear-\\eapon Powers, that could contemplate an added expendi-
ture of $1 70 million a year to del'elop a modest nuclear armament without 
reallocating a major p;\rl of their tcchnical resources irom constructive activities. 
For the small nuclear capabili ty sl1ggested costing $560 million a year, only the 
six appear capable of finding the necessary resources. 
97. \Vhat may be deri"ed correctly from the graph is an appreciation of thc 
relative magnitude of the eX]lCnditure on a nuclear force compared with other 
government expenditures on defence, education and health. Any further deduc-
tions from the grajlh should be made with caution, for it must be remembered 
that accounts are not kept in the same way and rates of currency exchange vary. 
~Iorcover, what 3re reported arc central and regional government expenditures, 
and in many countries education and health arc to a eon,iderablc extent fin;mced 
othenl'ise. 
d T he form of presentation of the statistical data "as decided by the consul-
tant expert group. 
i2 
T .u: t: II. XA llO:S-.'L EltPENDITl ' WES I:> I.Q I.: L\A LE:>T L':S-ITED STATtS OOU,AIIS 
lJ""~'r li dw(Q " ~ " Il'RI'~ 
, ""al • , l'rQ~ ",i/Jro'u ("",, ' y ,Y, . ",iI/'Q'" C, """}" ,"iI/ioNs ("~~I ' \" 
1%4 5-1.514 USA 3~,S28 USA 40,836 USA 
19M 14,76~ U~SR 2 16.11)) L·SSR 20.339 USSR 
1964 :-.615 UK J -1,3-16 t:K 3,231 Germany, F.R. 
1964 .. 1.016 Germany. F.R. 4 z.z~ Germany. F.R. 3,138 UK 
1964 3,891 France 5 1.003 Italy 1.207 Australia 
1964 1,702 India 6 I.fL?O Canada R.l8 Poland 
1964 1.568 Canada 7 1.033 Japan -lIS Canada 
1964 1.467 haly 8 1.008 l\clhtrlands 2-1S India 
1964 924 PO\;l1ld , 1,002 Poland 183 Denmark 
~ 1964 774 Swedl':n iO 7J<; Belgium 173 Sweden 
~ 
1964 73. Nethcrlnnds II -"82 India 172 Vcnuuda 
1964 :'39 Al1stralia 12 572 Sweden ( 1963) 165 Brnzil 
196' 496 J3e1gium 13 468 AII~lralia 163 New Zei!.land 
1964 443 Yugoslavia 14 (196.3) 373 Brazil 1J<; Argentina 
1964 427 Japan 15 301.5 )Ie"ico ( 19(3) 128 Bulgaria 
(1963) 369 Spain 
" 
2'3 Finland 107 Finland 
1964 34<1 Switzerland 17 262 Arg('TItina 73 Yugoslavia 
1964 3'" Turkey J8 2-13 Denmark 64 Mexico 
(l96J) 314 Brazil 19 (1963) 221 Ilulgarii!. 60.' Turkey 
1964 302 Argentinn " 219 Turke~ 53.8 Peru 1964 ,.7 UAR " 217 Allstrii!. SO.8 UAR 1964 2S0.5 Israel Z2 (1963) 20S Spain 47.S South Africa 










'''' '''' 1964 
1964 
(1963) 
T.\HI.v. 11. :-l ... T10S",lo r.:UOllHTt·JtV.S IS EQUI\'M .EST USITf.O ST ... TES DDlolo ... Jt!! 
(amli"Nrd) 
U~/uct l:·dM€~h" .. 
• Su,.l • ",,1/, ... , l"d"H", N". ""/I,,, .. , C ...... ,.,. 
193 Iran " 115 New Zealand ( 196.1) 188 Gretee 28 11 5 Peru 
176.3 Portugal 29 II. Chile 
165 Indonesia 30 107 Yugoslavia 
160 South Africa Jl 105 Thailand 
144 Venezuela 32 94.' Israd 
132 Austria 33 (1963) 89 Nigeria 
130 ~ I cxico 34 7.5.1 South Africa 
130 Finland J5 ,. Pakistan 
94.1 Thailand 36 41.3 Portugal 
78.5 Chile J7 41.1 Switzl'1"land 
78.2 Peru 38 14 lndom:s;a 
" )Jew Ze31:l11d J9 76 Phi lippines 4. 
53.3 :\!ig~ri:, 41 
1~F.r[R.:so:: t.:'liICd )Jations SI(l/iSli((l/ )'ra,.book, 196.'i, lables 191 aud 185. 
lI~al.~ 
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